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My dissertation uses international evidence to provide fresh perspectives on the interaction of firms 
and the secondary market. Chapter 1 is an empirical study of the causal effect of an initial public 
offering (IPO) on a firm’s investments.  The study focuses on a historical event: the 2012 Chinese 
IPO moratorium. This event addresses the endogeneity problem associated with IPOs. It 
independently sorted into two groups the Chinese applicant firms of 2012—those that went public 
as scheduled and those that were delayed for at least a year. I find that firms that went public on 
schedule made significantly more investment in fixed assets after their IPO compared to similar 
firms that faced a one-year delay. The increase in investment is on average 36.4% of the firms’ 
pre-IPO level—a pronounced amount that generates policy implications. Chapter 2 uses a unique 
dataset from 1999–2015 to show that the number of trading halts is a significant source of 
illiquidity in the market for Chinese A shares. The risk of trading halts is not predicted by the bid-
ask spread but is predicted by end-of-day transactions cost measures, suggesting that the measures 
of transactions costs have more information than the bid-ask spread. The discretionary trading 
halts are associated with a robust “run up and reverse” pattern of cumulative abnormal return. On 
average they earn negative returns for investors who purchase the stocks right before the trading 
halts, but earn positive returns for existing investors who already hold the stocks for a longer 
period. Financially constrained firms and firms engaging in earnings manipulation create more 
trading halts and their trading halts have a larger impact on the price. Trading halts generally 
 decrease for firms that split stock supporting the “catering” motive for halts. Chapter 3 examines 
whether sensation-seeking is an important determinant of trading volume by looking at cross-
country evidence. This paper validates that sensation-seeking plays a significant role in explaining 
cross-country variation in excess trading volume. Internationally, market efficiency is not strong 
enough to drive sensation-seekers out of the market. Overconfidence and risk appetite do not take 
away the explanatory power of sensation-seeking. 
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Chapter 1  
The Causal Effect of IPO on Firms’ Investment 
1. Introduction 
The Initial Public Offering (IPO) is one of the most significant events in the life of a firm. 
An IPO drastically changes two aspects of it: financial constraints and ownership. On the one hand, 
an IPO provides the issuing firm with a large amount of cash, allows it to access the equity market 
for the first time, and mitigates the firm’s financial constraints. On the other hand, an IPO changes 
the firm’s status from private to public, forces the firm to disclose its quarterly performance, and 
can exacerbate the firms’ agency problem through such issues as managerial short-termism.1 
The mitigation of financial constraints and the increase in agency problems can have 
profound but opposite impacts on a firm’s investment behavior. Financial constraints theory 
suggests that firms under financial constraints forego valuable investment opportunities due to 
financial distress risk and the higher cost of capital (Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004; 
Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, & Poterba, 1988). Getting listed reduces firms’ financial 
constraints and enables them to increase their investment to achieve more optimal levels (Brav, 
2009; Maksimovic, Phillips, & Yang, 2013; Saunders & Steffen, 2011). Nevertheless, research into 
agency problems suggests that managerial short-termism and myopic behavior can lead public 
firms to under-invest because some long-term investment can hurt short-term earnings through 
depreciation and other start-up charges (Asker, Farre-Mensa, & Ljungqvist, 2015; Graham, Harvey, 
                                                 
1 Ritter and Welch (2002) survey discusses the various motives for IPO. 
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& Rajgopal, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Stein, 2003). The effect of an IPO on investment 
remains an empirical question.  
The purpose of this study is to examine how an IPO changes a firm’s investment behavior. 
The answer is not obvious. The results of prior empirical studies are often mixed. For example, 
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) find that Italian firms decrease investment after their IPOs. 
Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2010) find that U.S. firms, in contrast, increase investment after their 
IPO.  Asker et al. (2015) document that public firms invest substantially less than similar private 
firms and are less sensitive to investment opportunities; while Gilje and Taillard (2016) argue that 
public firms in the natural gas industry are more sensitive to investment opportunities than private 
firms. These seemingly contradictory results can coexist because attempts to identify empirically 
the treatment effect of IPOs on investment are complicated: firms endogenously choose whether 
to conduct an IPO (selection) and when to do so (timing). Selection bias, such as the inherent 
difference between firms who undertake IPOs and those firms that do not, can bias cross-sectional 
estimations. Meanwhile, the timing of the IPO decision can bias time-series estimations. Most IPO 
researchers thus limit their goal to studying the within-firm dynamic around an IPO or to the 
comparison of public and private firms without drawing causal inferences. 
To address this endogeneity problem, an ideal setting would be a randomized controlled 
experiment involving a set of identical firms: Randomly assign IPO permissions to some of the 
firms while rejecting the others. In this paper, I investigate a quasi-experimental event that is 
similar to this ideal setting. The event—the 2012 Chinese IPO moratorium—independently sorted 
more than 600 firms that had applied for an IPO into two groups: The first group could conduct 
their IPO on schedule; the other group had to wait at least a year. I take advantage of this real, 
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historical event to study the causal effect of the IPO, by itself, on firms’ subsequent investment 
behavior. 
The moratorium was exogenous to firms’ characteristics and their decisions to make stock 
offerings. In November 2012, to keep the stock market stable, the Chinese stock market 
supervising authority, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), initiated an 
unannounced IPO moratorium and it froze IPO reviews. The moratorium was unprecedented in 
duration and impact. It affected more than 600 firms for more than a year, 332 of which were 
eventually listed. In the 14 months between November 2012 and January 2014, there was no IPO 
activity in the entire Chinese stock market (A shares market), which had been the largest IPO 
market in the world before the moratorium and remained so afterwards. The moratorium denied 
applicant firms’ access to both the stock market and the bond market.2 In Section 2, I provide 
details of the moratorium, including its exogenous nature. One of the key mechanisms is the merit-
based regulation system of stringent requirements that the CSRC enacted to make applicant firms 
relatively homogeneous. The regulation also resulted in a long preparation stage for Chinese IPO 
applications that commonly took three years. In this study, I define the treatment as the event of 
listing, the treatment group as the 154 firms that were listed in 2012 right before the moratorium, 
and the control group as the 332 moratorium-affected firms that experienced at least a one-year 
delay in their IPO process. The merit-based regulation system ensures that the treated group and 
the control group are similar in these characteristics: they are both IPO applicants and eventually 
got listed. The long preparation stage also ensures that the firms were unlikely to have anticipated 
the moratorium when they made their decision to go IPO three years before. Therefore, the 
                                                 
2 The Chinese corporate bond market is hardly available to private firms. 
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moratorium is exogenous to the firms’ characteristics and their decision to go public, and some 
checks of robustness further validate this claim.  
Utilizing a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy, I find that going public generates a 
positive effect on firms’ investments in fixed assets. The results are both statistically and 
economically significant. On average, the investment rate, as measured by a firm’s investment in 
fixed assets over its 2011 level for an average firm that conducts an IPO on schedule, is 36.4% 
more than that of a similar moratorium-affected firm. As the moratorium is exogenous, the effect 
can be neatly attributed to the difference between the two groups in receiving IPO treatment or not. 
My results are also robust to different definitions of the treatment and different definitions of 
investment. Matched public firms are also used as an alternative control group; the results from 
both these two tests remain qualitatively similar. A placebo test is conducted to compare 2014-
listed firms and 2015-listed firms within the control group. No significant difference exists 
between the 2014-listed firms and the 2015-listed firms, suggesting that time-of-application does 
not drive my results. This positive effect of the IPO event on firms’ investment has two 
implications. First, it suggests that the financial-constraints effect prevails over the impact arising 
from agency problems in determining post-IPO firms’ investment behaviors. Second, it suggests 
that firms conduct an IPO to increase their potential productivity rather than to monetize high 
valuations after their productivity peak. I test these two implications.  
To investigate the financial-constraints channel, I first look at whether the treated firms’ 
post-IPO characteristics are consistent with lessened financial constraints. I find that an IPO 
increases the treated firms’ cash balance and reduces cash spending on financing activities. These 
two results that arise subsequent to the IPO demonstrate that going public can reduce firms’ distress 
risk and financial cost. Although post-IPO firms initially decrease their liabilities in the first post-
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IPO year, they increase their liabilities in subsequent years. The increase in liabilities suggests that 
post-IPO firms appear to consider the amount of cash raised through an IPO insufficient since they 
sought additional funding, which had a higher cost of capital. This behavior supports the notion 
that financial constraints were binding for the pre-IPO firms. Finally, I find that the treatment group 
experienced a larger asset growth than the control group, even after the entire control group went 
public. These results suggest that going public alleviated a firm’s financial constraints. Not only 
did the IPO provide capital; it also enabled firms to raise more debt financing. This allowed the 
firms with their IPO on schedule to grow larger than the moratorium-affected firms. The finding 
further strengthens the argument that pre-IPO firms are under financial constraints and have not 
reached their optimal investment level; going public increases investment through lessening 
financial constraints. 
After establishing the benefit of increasing investment after IPOs, I next investigate 
whether the agency problems effect is binding, especially that of managerial short-termism. 
Agency theory predicts that increasing investments come at the expense of short-term-earnings 
loss as the main motivation for public firms’ underinvestment. I investigate this channel by looking 
at the earnings of post-IPO firms. The post-IPO decrease in firms’ net profit is well documented 
in the empirical literature. Researchers typically use the life cycle theory of firms to explain this 
stylized fact. In particular, firms conduct an IPO after their productivity has peaked to monetize 
higher firm value; firms are unable to maintain the high operating performance after their IPOs. 
To test this explanation directly, I compare firms that are at a similar stage in their life cycles but 
received a different IPO treatment. I find that the decrease in net profit only happens to firms that 
conduct an IPO, not to similar firms whose IPO was delayed. This evidence suggests that the IPO 
causes a decrease in earnings rather than signaling that productivity has peaked. The result supports 
 6 
 
the claim that the agency-problems effect is binding. The combined results—that both financial-
constraints effect and agency-problems effect are binding—are consistent with firms choosing to 
increase their investment despite a negative-earning effect and a loosening of financial constraints 
outweighing managerial short-termism. 
Overall, the study makes three distinct contributions to the existing literature. First, it 
contributes to the IPO literature by using a quasi-experimental setting to address the endogeneity 
problem associated with IPO: It quantifies the causal effect of IPOs on firms’ investment. The 
magnitude of my result—the IPO causes a firm to increase its investment on fixed assets by 
36.4%–—suggests that an IPO can profoundly increase firms’ investments. In analyzing the trade-
off between lessened financial constraints and increased agency problems after IPOs, firms choose 
to increase long-term investment despite the short-term negative-earning effect. The study also 
provides causal evidence for the relationship of the IPO to firms’ productivity as implied by the 
life cycle theory of firms. Going public helps a firm increase its productivity rather than signaling 
that its productivity has peaked. 
Second, the results corroborate  findings in recent papers that compare the difference in 
investment behavior between public and private firms (Asker et al., 2015; Gilje & Taillard, 2016). 
By studying a particular group of firms—IPO applicants—I provide a dynamic perspective on 
their findings. In determining their post-IPO investment behaviors, financial constraints have a 
much larger effect than agency problems for firms that are large, mature and profitable. This result 
stands in contrast to much of the previous literature, which assumes that financial constraints are 
less—or even not—binding for large firms. In addition, my results speak to the recent literature 
about the real effect of the stock market (Florysiak & Goyal, 2016; Levine, Lin, & Xie, 2016; 
Zingales, 2015). My results establish a causal channel, which suggests that gaining access to the 
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stock market can increase firms’ long-term investment, thus increasing total societal output, given 
that corporate investment is one of the key drivers of economic growth. 
Finally, this paper has potential policy implications given the argument of Shan & Zhu 
(2015) that problematic IPOs are one of the main contributors to China’s poor stock market 
performance. To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first attempt to use quasi-experimental 
methods to quantify the real effect of the 2012 Chinese IPO moratorium. Since the CSRC’s mission 
is to stabilize the market, the performance of firms who apply for an IPO is a secondary issue. My 
study quantifies the real effect of going public; it suggests that the IPO moratorium resulted in a 
large potential loss in investment opportunities as well as a loss in economic growth arising from 
the moratorium. This study has relevance to the recent historically high number of IPO applicant 
firms. It also increases our understanding of the Chinese IPO market—which since 2000 has often 
been the world’s largest IPO market (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2013). My paper quantifies the 
real effect of IPOs on corporate investment and urges the CSRC to reconsider its role to better 
promote the welfare of IPO applicant firms.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides relevant institutional 
details about the Chinese market, details about the moratorium, and a discussion of why the 
Chinese IPO moratorium was an exogenous shock to the IPO market. Section 3 introduces the 
details of my methodology, describes the data, and provides summary statistics. Section 4 provides 
results and analysis. Section 5 concludes and provides policy implications. 
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2. Institutional Background 
2.1 The Chinese IPO Market  
According to Doidge et al. (2013), China has become the world’s fastest growing IPO 
market. Total Chinese IPO proceeds have cumulatively exceeded those of the U.S. since 2000. The 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) supervises the Chinese IPO market through 
merit-based regulation. Under this regulation system, a firm must satisfy certain size and 
profitability thresholds to qualify for an IPO application. The details are reported in Appendix A. 
This regulation ensures that only mature, profitable and large private companies that are 
comparable to existing public companies can apply for an IPO in China. The purpose of these 
regulations is to protect retail investors who have an information disadvantage. The IPO 
application preparation stage typically takes about three years depending on the firm’s prior 
conditions. After completing preparations, the firm submits its IPO application, and the Public 
Offering Review Committee (the PORC) holds a review meeting to decide whether or not the 
company will be approved for listing. The PORC consists 25 members, mostly lawyers, auditors, 
with some government officials and scholars. The approval decision is primarily based on the 
truthfulness of the reports and the PORC’s judgement of the applicant’s future earning potential.  
Applications are reviewed in the order in which they were received. In 2012, the approval 
rate of the review meetings was over 80%. Prior to the 2012 moratorium, the wait time for the 
review meeting was usually three to six months and started to increase due to the increasing 
number of applicants. The wait time drastically increased following the moratorium. Although this 
unique regulatory procedure of the Chinese market limits the diversification of public companies, 
it generates a homogenous sample where all applicant firms are similar in size, profit and age. The 
applicant firms are also at a similar stage in their lifecycles. Therefore, the institutional structure 
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of the Chinese IPO market ensures that the applicant firms within a short period, such as a year, 
are qualitatively comparable both in the cross section and in the time series. Meanwhile, private 
companies that filed their IPO application are highly unlikely to have anticipated the moratorium 
given the lengthy preparation stage and review process, when they first decided to conduct their 
IPOs three or four years prior to the moratorium. I provide evidence for this claim in the discussion 
as well. Therefore, the merit based regulation system ensures that the moratorium is independent 
of firms’ characteristics, as well as their decision of IPO. 
On February 1, 2012, the PORC started to disclose the list of applicant firms. There are 
four dates for each firm in the disclosed list: IPO application feedback date, IPO application pre-
disclose date, IPO initial review date, and the PORC review meeting date. Only the record of the 
PROC review meeting date is complete for each company; the records of the other three dates are 
often incomplete. In most cases, there is only one date out of the three that is recorded. The poor 
bookkeeping of these records also affects the accuracy of reported dates: the PORC started to 
disclose the applicant list on February 1, 2012, and if they did not document the data before the 
disclosure, they recorded the feedback date as February 1, 2012. This results in a cluster of records 
for February 1, 2012 in my sample. To clearly identify firms that applied for an IPO prior to the 
moratorium as the control group, I use the method that is the most unfavorable to my hypothesis. 
I construct a variable, Review Date, which is equal to the earliest of the four dates for each applicant 
firm. The Review Date thus represents the first time that the company appears in the PROC’s 
disclosed applicant list. Although the date may be later than the firms’ actual application, a firm 
with a Review Date earlier than October 19, 2012, the date of the last reviewing meeting before 
the moratorium, undoubtedly applied to have an IPO prior to the moratorium. The treatment group 
is defined as firms that went public in 2012 and submitted their IPO application no earlier than 
 10 
 
2011. The control group contains firms whose review date is in 2012 but before October 19, 2012. 
This definition allows me to overcome the bookkeeping errors and have a clean identification of 
the treatment group and the control group. 
Figure 1 plots the Review Date and the Listing Date for both the treatment group and the 
control group. The majority of the treated firms and the control firms started their application 
within a year with many of them overlapping with each other. Given the long preparation process 
associated with Chinese IPO applications, the treatment group and the control group are at a similar 
stage of their lifecycles. 
Figure 1-1 
2.2 The 2012 IPO Moratorium 
Prior to 2016 there have been eight IPO moratoriums in China: four in mid-2005, one half-
year moratorium from December 6, 2008 to June 29, 2009, one brief moratorium in mid-2012, one 
from November 3, 2012 to December 30, 2013, which was the longest of the moratoriums, and 
finally the most recent one from June to November 2015. In my paper, I use the term 2012 IPO 
moratorium to refer only to the moratorium that occurred from November 3, 2012 to December 
30, 2013. 
Over 600 firms submitted their applications and were waiting for the review meeting in 
November 20123. In comparison, previous IPO moratoriums only affected dozens of firms. There 
was no official announcement of either the start or the end of the 2012 IPO moratorium. In 2012, 
the PROC met weekly to review IPO applications and announced to the public the result of the 
                                                 
3 Based on the IPO applicant list published by the PROC 
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review meeting: which firms they reviewed, whose applications they approved and dismissed, and 
the reasons for the dismissals. The last review meeting in 2012 was held on October 19, and, 
without any official announcement, the PROC halted review meetings. The last firms who received 
approval at the October 19 meeting went public on November 3, 2012. The market quickly 
interpreted the halt of review meetings as an IPO moratorium but the majority of market 
participants were expecting IPO activities to resume soon, as the previous IPO moratoriums did 
not last very long and did not impact as many firms. Surprisingly, from November 3, 2012 to 
December 19, 2013, there were no review meetings, and no IPO in the A shares market. 
A host of causes were responsible for the prolonged duration of the 2012 IPO moratorium, 
including the weak market performance and sensitive political environment throughout 2013. 
Appendix B discusses these reasons in detail. The motivation of the CSRC for first initiating the 
moratorium was to stabilize the stock market and to protect stock investors. It considered the 
supply of funds in the Chinese stock market to be relatively fixed and believed that IPOs would 
drive funds away from current stocks and exert downward pressure on current stock prices (Sun 
& Tong, 2003). Therefore, the CSRC halted IPOs to stabilize the price of existing stocks. Based 
on a time-constrained keyword search on Google, the possibility of using the moratorium to 
stabilize the market was not suggested until August 2012. Around October 2012 the media and 
retail investors regularly requested the moratorium.  
Whether an IPO moratorium can help to stabilize the price of current stocks remains an 
open question (Packer & Spiegel, 2016); it is not the focus of this paper. This paper concentrates 
instead on the fact that the CSRC’s primary concern is keeping the current stock market stable, 
while the welfare of pre-IPO firms is only a secondary consideration. This CSRC’s strengthens the 
likelihood that the moratorium was an exogenous event to the IPO applicant firms. Neither the 
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firms’ characteristics nor their potential lobbying efforts likely had much impact on the moratorium 
decision. 
Apart from its unprecedented and surprisingly long duration and the large number of firms 
affected by it, the 2012 IPO moratorium also coincides with two regulatory changes that makes it 
possible to identify moratorium-affected firms and obtain their pre-application data. The first 
regulatory event, which was previously discussed, is the PROC’s disclosure of the list of applicant 
firms. From this list, one can identify which firms that were allowed to proceed with their IPO and 
which firms’ IPOs were delayed as a result of the moratorium. The second regulatory event 
occurred at the start of 2014. When the CSRC started to resume IPOs, it required all applicant 
firms to pre-disclose their financial statements from 2011 to 2014. Before the regulatory change, 
Chinese IPO firms were required to publicly pre-disclose financial statements for the three years 
prior to their IPO application, after they passed the PROC’s review meeting. The regulatory change 
requires all IPO applicants to pre-disclose their financial statements even before the PROC’s 
review meeting. As many moratorium-affected firms were not reviewed until 2015, this regulatory 
change provided the 2011 financial statements for all moratorium-affected firms which is essential 
for ensuring that the treatment group and the control group are similar.  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data Source and Sampling 
My analysis is based on the universe of firms listed on the A shares stock market and 
specifically firms that were listed between 2012 and 2015. The financial statement data, firms’ 
profiles and their IPO information are obtained from information that the Wind Financial Terminal 
 13 
 
(WFT) reports4. WFT is the Chinese equivalent of Bloomberg, Datastream and Compustat. More 
than 90% of financial enterprises in the Chinese market and over 75% of Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors use WFT5. WFT has information on public firms’ daily security information 
and their financial statement items. WFT’s news channel also collects articles covering the 
moratorium.  
In May 2016, the A shares market contained 2,898 listed firms; 596 of them were listed in 
and after 2012. The treatment group contains firms that were listed in 2012 before the moratorium 
but submitted their IPO applications no earlier than 2011. There are 154 firms in the treatment 
group. The control group includes firms that applied to IPO before October 19, 2012, were affected 
by the moratorium, and eventually got listed. There are 332 firms in the control group. Therefore, 
my sample contains the 486 firms that were listed after 2012 and applied to IPO between January 
1, 2011 and October 19, 2012. 
The firms’ pre-disclosed financial statements prior to their IPO are combined with their 
disclosed financial statements after their IPO. A sample of financial statement variables from 2009 
to 2015 is utilized. The sample is an unbalanced panel data set. The treatment group, with firms 
listed in 2012, have data from 2009 to 2015, with the data from 2009 to 2011 drawn from the 
treated firms’ pre-disclosure. The control group, with moratorium-affected firms listed in 2014 and 
in 2015, have data from 2011 to 2015, with the data from 2011 to 2013 drawn from the firms’ pre-
disclosure. The variables are chosen from the firms’ annual reports to measuring their end-of-year 
performance. 
                                                 




3.2 Variable Construction 
The variable of interest is the change in investment. Following the convention of the 
corporate finance literature adapted to the Chinese accounting practices, I construct a variable, 
InvestmentRate, to proxy for firms’ growth of investment spending. The InvestmentRate is equal 
to the ratio of net cash outflow for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets scaled 
by the firm’s fixed assets in 2011. Specifically, I obtain “cash outflow for purchasing fixed assets, 
intangible assets and other long-term assets” and “cash inflow from processing fixed assets, 
intangible assets and other long-term assets,” deducting the latter from the former and constructing 
a variable to proxy for firms’ capital expenditure, the FixedInvestment. The FixedInvestment 
measures the net cash outflow for fixed, intangible and long-term assets. This metric is used as the 
analog of capital expenditure that is commonly used in the corporate literature to measure firms’ 
investment. The InvestmentRate is the FixedInvestment of a firm scaled by the firm’s pre-IPO level. 
As such, the variable measures the change of capital expenditure within a firm. Namely, for firm i 




 (1.1)  
There are several advantages to using the net cash outflow of fixed assets, intangible assets 
and other long-term assets. First, the accounting literature recognizes that firms’ cash flow is less 
subject to manipulation (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010). Under the strict audit of IPO applicants’ 
financial statements, the numbers from their cash flow statements are relatively more credible than 
from their income statements. Second, compared with investment in research and development 
and investment in advertisement, investment in fixed assets is more rigid and stable: the price of 
fixed assets, such as plants, land, and equipment, is more transparent and usually involves outside 
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transactions, whereas the price of paying scientists, acquiring patents, and paying agencies is less 
transparent and fluctuates more easily, especially in a short sample period like mine. Third, 
investment in fixed assets often has a larger and more direct impact on the real economy, such as 
employment, asset prices and productivity. Consequently, studying the cash spent on fixed assets 
has more straightforward implications for the real impact of an IPO.  
Although InvestmentRate measures growth of investment and provides a straightforward 
interpretation of the result, it may introduce extra volatility, as firms’ investment on fixed assets 
can swing from year to year.  An alternative to using the InvestmentRate is to use the 





 (1.2)  
I use this variable in my main specification as well as a robustness check. 
To further ensure that the treatment group and the control group are comparable, a large 
number of covariates are used to control for potential investment opportunities, firm characteristics, 
and a firm’s equity-dependent status. Specifically, the control variables include a firm’s age, total 
assets, cash inflow from sales to represent sales, fixed assets over number of employees to 
represent productivity, cash flow over total assets, leverage, operating revenue over assets, 
intangible assets over equity to represent firms’ asset tangibility, net profit, and an industry 
Herfindahl index in terms of sales to represent industry competition. Given that the IPO drastically 
changes firms’ characteristics, only firms’ characteristics in 2011 are used as control variables to 




In choosing the control variables I refer to two types of literature. The first set of articles 
study the real impact of financial constraints (see, for example, Hadlock and Pierce (2010)). The 
second set of research of which Campello et al. (2014) is representative studies the Chinese stock 
market. Since Chinese accounting practices differ from those in the United States, the variables 
chosen measure the elements that interest scholars studying the real impact of financial constraints 
and reflect the most stable and accurate information available through Chinese accounting 
practices. I also control for the listing conditions that the CSRC requires. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
In this subsection, I supply two panels of descriptive statistics. Panel A of Table 2 compares 
the treatment group and the control group for 2011, 2013, and 2015. Since neither group was listed 
in 2011, only the treatment group was listed in 2013, while both groups were listed in 2015, the 
unconditional comparison provides us with an overview of the consequences of the moratorium. 
Panel B of Table 2 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for the average firm in the sample for the 
entire period. To put these numbers into perspective, I compare them with the average listed firm 
in the Chinese stock market.  I winsorize the data to address outlier issues (Barnett & Lewis, 1994) 
and display the winsorized results only. Appendix C presents the un-winsorized results. Most of 
the key results do not change.  
Table 1-2 
Panel A shows that the gap between the treatment and control groups is much smaller than 
that between the sample firms and the public ones. The gap is especially small in 2011, when both 
groups were at the IPO preparation or application stages. For example, in 2011, the average size 
of the control group is at 90% of that of the treatment group and the other variables are of similar 
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scales. A simple t-test fails to reject the hypothesis that the treatment group and the control group 
are no different. These differences demonstrate that, quantitatively, the treatment group and the 
control group were similar prior to the treatment. The increased difference between the two groups 
in 2015, after the treatment and after both groups of firms went public, suggests that a differential 
IPO treatment causes the two groups to diverge. It is worth noting that even in 2013, the difference 
between the groups, although large, are mostly insignificant. The primary reason is the large 
standard deviation, a pattern of difference emerges when I compare the growth, rather than level, 
in my empirical tests. 
From Panel B, we learn that, when compared to public firms, firms in my sample are, on 
average, younger, smaller, have less revenue, hire less people, and makes less profit. The difference 
between public firms and the firms in my sample is large. For example, in 2011, the average size 
of the sample firms is only 27% of that of the public firms. However, the ratio grows to 36% in 
2015 after the sample firms are all listed. Meanwhile, the standard deviations of the statistics are 
quite large. They are usually larger than the means reflecting the diversity of the firms. 
3.4 Identification Strategy 
Previous studies attempting to link IPOs and investment usually do not try to infer causality 
due to the endogenous nature of the firms’ IPO decisions. For example, Pagano et al. (1998) use 
firms ex-ante characteristics to predict their IPO decision but find that the explanatory power of 
such decision-to-go-public models is too limited to use in a two-stage procedure that corrects the 
selection problem. The exception is Bernstein (2015). The author uses two months of NASDAQ 
return fluctuation that ranges between 3% and negative 6% during IPO applicant’s book building 
phase as the instrument variable to mitigate the selection problem. Since short-run market 
fluctuation is more likely to affect marginal firms, the scope of the study is limited to firms that 
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are prone to market timing, which may be independent of innovation studied by Bernstein, but 
may not be independent of investment. In contrast, the current study furthers our understanding of 
IPO firms by investigating a local and precipitous shock that had a large impact on a broader group 
of firms. The firms in my sample were determined to conduct IPOs despite the declining stock 
market performance6 and the uncertain future posed by the moratorium, and they have no freedom 
to choose their treatment status. 
The 2012 Chinese IPO moratorium is an exogenous shock on the applicant firms’ 
permission for listing. The moratorium independently bifurcated IPO permissions into two 
otherwise similar (qualitatively and quantitatively) groups of firms. One group successfully went 
public on schedule prior to the moratorium. The moratorium delayed the other group’s IPOs for 
over a year. Since the objective of this paper is to study the treatment effect of IPOs, the groups 
that were listed prior to the moratorium are defined as the treatment group with the moratorium-
affected firms defined as the control group. 
As shown in Angrist and Krueger (1999), a difference-in-difference (DID) methodology is 
well suited to identify the effects of a sharp change, like the one in my setting. The DID approach 
controls for potential unobserved differences between the treatment group and the control group, 
while exploiting the sudden shock of the moratorium to firms’ IPO processes.  
I estimate two slightly different DID equations. These estimations differ in the definition 
of treatment time and sample period. Equation (1.3) uses 2012 as the treatment time: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝑤𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝜃𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.3) 
                                                 
6 For example, in the middle of 2013, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index, the major stock index 
for Chinese markets, hit a historic low of 1849.65. 
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Here, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the variable of interest defined in equation (1.1); 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is an 
indicator variable that equals one if firms belong to the treatment group and zero otherwise; 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 
is an event dummy that equals one at and after 2012 and zero before. 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control 
variables. 𝜃 gives the DID estimate of the effect of an IPO on yit. The sample period for equation 
(1.3) is 2011-2013. Equation (1.3) operates on a straightforward intuition. Namely, in 2011, both 
the treatment group and the control group apply to IPO, and these two groups are identical. In 2012, 
the treatment group receives the treatment of IPO, but the control group does not; the sorting of 
IPO permissions is independent. In 2013, the treated firms are listed, while the control group is 
waiting so the different investment behaviors between the two groups corresponds fully to the 
differing status of their IPO. The treatment here is IPO versus non-IPO, or more specifically, on-
schedule with IPO versus one year delay in IPO process. However, for this specification to measure 
the causal effect of IPOs, there are two prerequisites: the treatment group and the control group 
need to be identical and the sorting of treatment status needs to be independent. I provide evidence 
to argue that these two prerequisites are likely to hold through institutional details and through the 
comparison of the treatment group and the control group in Table 2a, and further discuss it in the 
next subsections. 
Equation (1.4) uses event time – the year of the IPO – as the treatment time: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝜃𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.4)  
Here, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the variable of interest InvestmentRate; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is an indicator variable that 
equals one if firms belong to the treatment group and zero otherwise; 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is an event dummy 
that equals one for the year of and the years after firm i goes public and zero before. 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector 
of control variables. 𝜃 gives the DID estimate of the effect of an IPO on yit. The sample period is 
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2009-2015, with the treatment group’s coverage ranging from 2009 to 2015 and the control group’s 
coverage ranging from 2011 to 2015. This unbalanced panel and the individual treatment effect 
equation estimates the treatment effect on a firm’s investment of being able to conduct an IPO on 
schedule versus having to wait at least a one-year in its IPO process. The difference between the 
treatment group and the control group is the differential sorting into receiving the IPO moratorium. 
Yet, eventually, all firms in the sample are listed. Thus, the treatment is not IPO versus non-IPO. 
Rather, the treatment involves whether the IPO was on schedule or delayed. The shortcoming of 
equation (1.3) is that it cannot disentangle the differential effect of an IPO over time apart from 
time effect. As 𝑑𝑖𝑡 coincides with year, including year fixed effects can absorb the treatment effect. 
I include this specification as a robustness test. 
Following Bertrand et al. (2004) and Petersen (2009), I estimate robust standard errors 
clustered by each stock ticker. Four empirical specifications are used in estimating each equation. 
The first specification includes only 𝑇𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑖 . It serves as the benchmark. The second 
specification includes the control variables. It serves as the main specification because the 𝜃 
coefficient represents the treatment effect on two firms from two different groups that are similar 
in terms of the control variables. I report the economic significance based on the results of this 
specification. The third specification includes firm fixed effects but excludes the control variables 
and 𝑇𝑖 as they are absorbed by firm fixed effects. This specification serves as a robustness test to 
check whether the effect can be attributed to firm-specific effects. The fourth specification includes 
both firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Including year fixed effects can absorb the treatment 
effect of equation (1.3) but should not affect the treatment effect of equation (1.4) as the sorting of 
treatment status happens to the treatment group and the control group at the same time. 
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The null hypothesis is 𝜃 = 0. If the effect of financial constraints prevails over the effect 
of agency problem, then firms should increase their investment on fixed assets; and we expect 𝜃 >
0. Otherwise, if the effect of agency problems is more important then we should observe 𝜃 < 0.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Effect of IPO on Investment 
Figure 2 previews the results intuitively by plotting the unconditional mean of 
InvestmentRate over 2011-2015, by the treatment group and the control group. Focusing on year 
2011-2013, we observe that in 2011, the three groups all have the same InvestmentRate at one. 
This is a mechanical result because InvestmentRate is constructed as a firm’s investment on fixed 
assets over its 2011 level. In 2012, when the treatment group went public, that group had a slightly 
higher InvestmentRate. However, in 2013, the InvestmentRate by the treatment group diverged 
significantly from that of the control group. The treatment group, which benefited from IPOs, 
increased investment drastically while the control group, which was affected by the moratorium, 
remain relatively less invested. This difference marks the results of equation (3). When we look at 
2014 and 2015, we observe that the treatment of an IPO contributes to an increase of investment 
relative to the control group in both cases, marking the results of equation (4).  
Figure 1-2 
Tables 3a and 3b report the DID results of equation (3) and equation (4) respectively. Using 
InvestmentRate as the dependent variable, I find that an IPO results in a statistically significant 
increase in the firms’ investment behavior in subsequent years. The results are robust to the 
inclusion of firm controls as well as firm fixed effects. The result is robust to the inclusion of year 
fixed effects in equation (3), but, in equation (4), year fixed effects absorb the treatment effect as 
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discussed earlier. Similarly, since equation (3) features a balanced panel, firms either belong to the 
treatment group or the control group, and there is no switching in between them, equation (3) does 
not include firm fixed effects. Equation (4) is robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. Finally, 
Table 3c reports the DID result of the specification in equation (3) but the variable of 
InvestmentOverAssets defined in equation (2).  
Table 1-3 
The results are economically meaningful. Interpreting the coefficients from the 
specification with control variables, Table 3a suggests that in 2012 and in 2013, a firm that could 
conduct an IPO on schedule invested more in fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term 
assets. The increased amount is equal to 36.4% of its 2011 level compared to a similar frim that 
was affected by the moratorium and had to wait. Or, simply put, that the causal effect of IPO on 
firms’ investment on fixed assets is 36.4%. 
Similarly, Table 3b suggests that an average firm that is able to conduct an IPO on schedule, 
compared to receiving a one-year delay in the IPO process, will invest more in fixed assets, 
intangible assets, and other long-term assets, and the increased amount is equal to 34.1% of its 
2011 level. The significant coefficient in Table 3c suggests that the result is not driven by variation 
in a firm’s 2011 investment but by the firm’s change of investment from 2011 to 2013. Again, the 
conclusion of this paper is drawn based on the results of Table 3a. Table 3b and Table 3c only serve 
the purpose of robustness checks. 
4.2 Validity of the Experiment 
For the experiment to be valid, the treatment need to be exogenous. In Section 2, I 
introduced institutional features, especially the merit based regulation system, to qualitatively 
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argue that the treatment is exogenous. In this subsection, I provide quantitative evidence for the 
validity of the experiment – that the determinants of Y(0) are independent of the treatment and 
those of the treatment are independent of Y(0). 
The determinants of Y(0) are mostly firm characteristics. To prove that the determinants of 
Y(0) are independent of the treatment, I demonstrate that the treatment group and the control group 
are similar firms before the moratorium. In Table 2, the summary statistics, I have already shown 
that the treatment group and the control group are similar in their means. Figure 3 visually 
demonstrates that these two groups are similar in terms of industry composition and distribution. 
Figure 1-3 
The determinants of the treatment are mostly firms’ time of application. To prove that the 
determinants of the treatment are independent of Y(0), I demonstrate that the time of application 
does not drive my result. In other words, I demonstrate the validity of my “RDD”. Drawing an 
analog of the treatment group and the control group with the firms listed in 2014 and the firms 
listed in 2015, I conduct a placebo test. If the pre-IPO trend is dependent on the time of the IPO 
application, then we should observe different pre-IPO trends for the 2014-listed firms and the 
2015-listed firms in 2011, 2012 and 2013 prior to their IPO, as these two groups applied to have 
an IPO at different times. Table 4 conducts a placebo test using the 2014-listed firms as the placebo 
treatment group and the 2015-listed firms as the control group. If applying to have an IPO at 
different times results in different post-IPO investment behaviors, then we should observe 
significant results from this estimation. I find no significant difference in the InvestmentRate 
between the 2014-listed firms and the 2015-listed firms. The result strengthens the validity of 
equation (2) by showing that the timing of an IPO application does not significantly impact post-
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IPO investment behavior. The sorting of IPO treatment that arises as a result of the moratorium is 
independent of the outcome variable. 
Table 1-4 
4.3 Validity of the Coefficient 
After establishing the validity of the experiment, I also need to establish the validity of the 
coefficient. That is, does the coefficient measure what I claim to measure –  the causal effect of 
IPO –  rather than the causal effect of something else? 
There are two alternative hypotheses: First, public firms and private firms face different 
investment opportunities, and the result may reflect the difference in investment opportunities. 
Second, the control group firms are affected by the moratorium. They reduce their investment as 
a response, and the result may reflect the negative effect of the moratorium rather than the positive 
effect of IPOs. 
To test my hypothesis against these two alternatives, I compare the investment of the 
treatment group with that of an alternative control group – firms listed prior to2012. Specifically, 
I use a propensity score matching method to find public firms that are similar to the treatment 
group and compare their InvestmentRate with that of the treatment group in 2013. I find that the 
increased InvestmentRate of the treatment group is 53.4% more than that of the matched public 
firms. I also conduct a diff-in-diff estimation as in equation (2), using public firms as the alternative 
control group. Results are reported in Table 5. The coefficients of the difference-in-difference 
estimation are like that of the matching estimation. For example, the coefficient estimated with 
control variables is 51.6%. Since the treatment group’s fixed investment also increased relative to 
that of the public firms, the two alternative hypotheses are rejected. Stated differently, this 
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significant result confirms that the increase in investment is due to the change brought by IPOs 
rather than to any public versus private difference or the negative effect of the moratorium. This 
makes the interpretation of the results in Table 3 more robust to being the causal effect of IPO. 
Table 1-5 
4.4 Theoretical Implications 
After establishing that the result represents the causal effect of IPO on firms’ investment, I 
further test the implication of this result for corporate finance theories. The theoretical tension is 
that an IPO changes financial constraint, which leads to an increase in investment; an IPO changes 
agency problems, especially managerial short-termism, which lead to a decrease in investment. 
Since the causal effect of IPO on investment is positive, it seems that the financial constraints 
effect prevails over the managerial short-termism effect and that managers choose long-term 
investment over short-term earnings. However, there is one additional step necessary before 
endorsing such a conclusion. That is, we need make sure that both effects are binding to firms. The 
next section evaluates these two competing channels.  
4.4.1 Financial Constraints 
To test whether an IPO lessens financial constraints, I examine the consequences of an IPO 
that are associated with lessening financial constraints. In Figure 4, going public significantly 
increased the treated firms’ cash holdings. The mechanical result of an IPO is consistent with the 
financial constraints literature and indicates that IPOs reduce firms’ financial constraints. 
Figure 1-4 
Are financial constraints binding for IPO applicants? To test this question, I examine the 
liabilities ratio of IPO applicants. An IPO not only raises a large amount of capital for the issuer 
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but can also increase the issuer’s access to debt financing. According to the pecking order theory, 
firms prefer to use internal capital rather than debt to fund new projects. Thus, after raising 
significant cash through an IPO, the issuers would increase liabilities only when their financial 
constraints are binding. Table 6 finds that IPOs increase firms’ liabilities significantly. The fact 
that post-IPO firms actively seek new funding in addition to the capital raised through IPOs is 
strong evidence that they were financially constrained at the time of their IPOs and that an IPO 
lessened their financial constraints. 
Table 1-6 
4.4.2 Agency Problems and Post-IPO Earning Underperformance 
Having established that IPOs reduced firms’ previously binding financial constraints, I next 
test whether increasing investment led firms to suffer the consequences predicted by the agency 
theory. The agency literature demonstrates that public firms under-invest due to managerial short-
termism and their focus on earnings. The argument advanced is that although some investment 
may have positive net present value, firms may take a few years to realize this benefit and at the 
same time increase depreciation, hurting earnings. Due to agency problems, managers may forgo 
such investment opportunities to boost short-term earnings. Using my unique setting, I verify, in 
Figure 5, that an IPO does cause net profit to decrease while increasing investment. My results 
contribute to the agency literature by establishing a more exogenous link between investment and 
net profit. Moreover, my results demonstrate that firms do suffer a decrease in net profit as agency 
theory suggests. However, firms made a choice to increase investment despite the short-term 
negative effects, suggesting that the financial constraints effect plays a more important role in 




In addition to confirming that agency problems effects are binding, this result also 
disentangles the two competing hypotheses for the wildly-debated empirical finding: post-IPO 
earning underperformance. Most papers, including mine, find that after an IPO, firms are 
documented to have a worse operating performance, sometimes measured by profit over assets, 
than their pre-IPO levels. Controversy exists in the literature as to whether firms conduct an IPO 
to realize potential productivity or do so after their productivity peaks to take advantage of 
investors’ asymmetric information and to monetarize higher firm value. In other words, the 
association between an IPO and earning decrease is either a “signal” or a “causation”. The lifecycle 
theory of firms supports the “signal” argument, which generally sees the motivation for conducting 
an IPO as the result of firms’ reaching a certain stage in their lifecycles, usually around their 
productivity peaks. The short-term pressure view supports the “causation” argument, which 
generally sees increased investment after an IPO coming at the expense of decreased earnings. The 
current study is able to disentangle these two alternatives by comparing post-IPO firms with 
similar moratorium-affected firms. If the post-IPO operating underperformance is due to firms 
reaching their productivity peak prior to going IPO, we should expect the moratorium-affected 
firms to exhibit similar behaviors as the post-IPO firms, as they are at a similar stage. However, 
the operating underperformance, measured by net profit, only occurs for the post-IPO firms. This 
result suggests that an IPO serves as the cause of operating underperformance through increased 
investment. This evidence is consistent with firms conducting an IPO to raise funds to increase 




4.5.1 Selection Problem: 
Selection problem is a potential bias for my experiment. Specifically, moratorium-affected 
firms could choose to drop out of the pipeline and, in fact, many of them did. When the 2012 IPO 
moratorium was initiated, there were over 600 firms in the queue. The control group in my sample, 
the firms that eventually went public in the A shares market, contains only 332 firms. The 
companies that needed the money the most might not have waited and may have modified their 
plans instead. For example, they could choose to go public in foreign exchanges,7 to buy shell 
companies, or to be acquired by other firms.8 Further, the firms that received severe negative real 
shocks in their product markets would have to withdraw their IPO applications because they were 
no longer qualified to list. Although staying in the IPO pipeline is a choice, it biases against my 
result. In particular, since my study aims to test the causal effect of an IPO and the firms who 
dropped out of the pipeline – whether they found alternative financing or were disqualified – are 
the firms that needed to IPO the most, a stronger effect should exist among them. The bottom line 
is that, since the selection problem resulted in a more selective control group, excluding the drop-
out firms from the sample implies that my findings are understated. 
                                                 
7 If a company wants to go public oversees, CSRC used to require it have at least 400 million in net assets 
and at least 60 million in profit the previous year, but in 12.20.2012 this requirement was dropped: 
http://finance.caixin.com/2012-12-20/100474975.html. 
8 See, for example, Templin (2011), about Chinese reverse mergers. 
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4.5.2 China Specific: 
My study uses a unique quasi-experimental event that happened in the Chinese stock 
market. This may raise the question of the experiment’s external validity. That is, how much does 
the result have broader implications? 
The neat setting of the event and the tests for the two frictions – financial constraints and 
managerial short-termism – enable this paper to go beyond a Chinese-specific setting. The result 
represents a scenario, the Chinese stock market, where a firm faces high investment opportunities, 
high financial constraints, and high agency problem concerns. The statistically and economically 
significant results can provide better understanding of managers’ choices in scenarios where there 
are potential investment opportunities but financial constraints are also binding. These can occur 
beyond the Chinese setting, in emerging markets, in specific industries – especially high-tech ones 
– and in certain firms, especially new ones, in the United States(Robb & Robinson, 2012). 
Meanwhile, since the Chinese IPO market has become the largest in the world, learning its IPO 
dynamic is also worthwhile. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Discussions 
The 2012 Chinese IPO moratorium was a precipitous policy shock with an unprecedented 
impact. It exogenously sorted IPO permissions to 486 otherwise similar IPO applicant firms, 
allowing 154 of them to conduct their IPO on schedule and delaying the IPO process for the 
remaining 332 firms for over a year. This paper uses this episode to study and quantify the causal 
effect of IPO on firms’ investment behavior, shedding a unique light on the competing influence 
of financial constraints and agency problems associated with going public. 
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By employing a difference-in-difference approach, I find that an IPO has a statistically 
significant and economically meaningful effect on firms’ investment behavior: For a typical 
Chinese IPO applicant firm in 2012, IPO causes its investment on fixed assets to increase by 36.4%.  
This is consistent with the notion that the effect of mitigating financial constraints outweigh the 
effect of agency problems in determining the firms’ post-IPO investment behavior. 
I also provide suggestive evidence to the horserace between the two proposed channels, 
financial constraints and agency problems. I demonstrate that financial constraints were binding 
for pre-IPO firms; going public lessened the firms’ financial constraints. Meanwhile, an IPO causes 
net profit to decrease, which suggests that managers’ concern of the negative earning impact 
arising as the result of increasing investment is valid. In choosing to increase investment, firms 
reveal that the financial constraints effect outweighs the agency problems effect in determining 
their post-IPO investment behaviors. Lastly, I also find evidence that supports the notion that an 
IPO causes firms’ operating underperformance through increased investment, while rejecting that 
an IPO serves as a signal of a productivity peak. This finding provides concrete empirical evidence 
to support agency problems as the reason for the wildly-debated post-IPO earning 
underperformance phenomenon, while rejecting the lifecycle theory explanation. 
My study also generates policy implications in addition to empirical contributions. First, 
firms in my sample are large, mature and profitable. Many previous studies on financial constraints 
assume that such firms are immune to financial constraints. Using a local shock, I find that these 
firms are also subject to financial constraints since an IPO significantly increased their subsequent 
investment. Consequently, that access to equity markets has a huge potential to improve the firms’ 
investment and productivity and has a profound impact on the real economy. My finding suggests 
that regulators should consider reducing the barriers to public listing in a more active manner. 
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To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to quantify the real impact of the 2012 
Chinese IPO moratorium. A large IPO treatment effect exists with respect to the treated firms. The 
IPO moratorium exerted a pronounce opportunity cost on the control group firms. Although the 
welfare of the IPO applicant firms is only a secondary consideration of the CSRC, the CSRC 
should be cognizant of the impact of its administrative measures. My study provides a reference 





Figure 1-1: Sample Firms’ Application Date and Listing Date 
Figure 1 depicts the application dates and listing dates for the treatment group and the 
control group. The treatment group contains firms that were listed in 2012 before the moratorium. 
The control group contains firms that applied to IPO before the moratorium and went public in 
2014 and 2015. X axis is Review Date, which is the first date that the firm appears on the Public 
Offering Review Committee’s disclosed list. Listing Date is the date that the firm went public. Red 
triangles are control firms and grey triangles are treated firms. Hollow triangles are uncertain dates. 





Figure 1-2: InvestmentRate around IPO 
Figure 2 plots the average InvestmentRate along with 95% confidence intervals for the 





Figure 1-3: Treatment group and control group comparison 
Figure 1-3a 
Industry Composition 
Figure 1-3a plots the industry composition for the treatment group firms, and for the control 





Pre-IPO Leverage Distribution 
Figure 1-3b plots the histogram of leverage at 2011 for the treatment group and for the 






Figure 1-4: CashOverAssets around IPO 
Figure 1-4 plots the average CashOverAssets along with 95% confidence intervals for the 





Figure 1-5: Profit around IPO 
Figure 1-5a 
NetProfitRate around IPO 
Figure 1-5a plots the average NetProfitRate along with 95% confidence intervals for the 






Return on Assets around IPO 
Figure 1-5b plots the average ROA along with 95% confidence intervals for the treatment 





Table 1-1: List of Variables and Definition 
Variable Description 
Variables of Interest  
FixedInvestment 
Cash outflow for fixed, intangible and other long term assets  
- cash inflow for fixed, intangible and other long term assets 
InvestmentRate FixedInvestment / FixedInvestment2011 
Fixed Investment over Total Assets FixedInvestment / Total Assets2011 
CashOverAssets Ending balance of cash / Total Assets2011 
LiabilitiesRate Liabilities / Total Assets2011 
NetProfitRate Net profit / Net Profit2011 
Return on Assets Net profit / Total Assets2011 
Control Variables   
Age Firm's age in years 
Total Assets Total assets 
Sales Total cash inflow from sales 
Productivity Fixed assets over number of employees 
Cash Flow Cash flow from operations over total assets 
Leverage Total liability over total assets 
Revenue Operating revenue over total assets 
IA/E Intangible assets over equity 
Industry HHI Industry Herfindale index by assets 




Table 1-2: Descriptive Statistics 
The table lists descriptive information for all A-share stocks from 2011 to 2015. Panel A 
compares the treatment group, firms listed in 2012 before the moratorium, and the control group, 
moratorium-affected firms that are eventually listed, in 2011 and 2013, the year before the 
moratorium and the year after. The table also provides t-score of the hypothesis that Treatment – 
Control = 0. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics of the sample firms, which include both 
the treatment group and the control group, and that of the public firms. Variables are in million 






















Total Assets 1599.12 1462.32 136.8 -0.34  2605.26 2076.05 529.2 0.97 
 (4076.8) (4130.3) (401.0)   (5460.3) (5657.7) (545.6)  
Fixed Assets 326.86 283.07 43.78 0.56  492.32 416.72 75.60 0.69 
 (828.8) (786.4) (78.00)   (1194.4) (1095.8) (110.0)  
Long Term 
Investment 
268.75 159.54 109.2 0.96  340.44 140.98 199.5 1.45 
(1473.4) (634.9) (113.6)   (2128.5) (466.7) (137.3)  
Liabilities 807.76 828.39 -20.64 -0.08  1033.72 1201.45 -167.7 -0.47 
 (2252.4) (2625.5) (245.1)   (3240.5) (3826.2) (356.0)  
Net Profit 152.79 121.48 31.32 1.51  139.98 146.14 -6.159 -0.28 
 (230.0) (203.3) (20.68)   (215.9) (228.9) (21.92)  
Cash End 306.10 247.66 58.44 0.86  542.72 299.85 242.9** 3.19 
 (730.3) (679.9) (67.91)   (856.2) (743.1) (76.11)  
Age 10.87 10.26 0.608 1.25  12.87 12.26 0.608 1.25 
 (4.376) (5.251) (0.487)   (4.376) (5.251) (0.487)  

















Total Assets 6934.93 5652.70 1505.67 10508.47 3742.36 
 (11657.6) (8369.7) (4109.7) (16055.9) (8836.1) 
Fixed Assets 1396.18 1165.42 296.94 1991.63 619.76 
 (2561.2) (1962.8) (799.4) (3298.2) (1404.9) 
Liabilities 3994.97 3170.04 821.85 6153.92 1843.26 
 (7774.2) (5374.1) (2511.0) (10890.6) (5847.7) 
Total Revenue 3888.95 3648.55 1131.77 5101.72 1805.15 
 (6445.9) (5810.9) (2195.4) (7721.8) (3561.9) 
Total Operating Cost 3601.01 3345.57 979.57 4763.14 1551.00 
 (5964.5) (5372.9) (1987.6) (7104.5) (2942.2) 
Cash In Sales 3518.84 3278.01 1049.57 4583.96 1591.34 
 (5638.4) (4973.3) (1926.6) (6664.2) (2836.7) 
Net Profit 242.12 248.91 131.40 300.20 173.04 
 (417.1) (387.2) (212.4) (556.9) (323.5) 
Cash Out Fixed Assets 295.03 336.71 113.87 328.18 161.71 
 (492.9) (549.8) (252.0) (519.9) (298.4) 
Cash Out Financing 1689.34 1147.67 306.47 2881.76 813.73 
 (3265.0) (1808.8) (751.3) (5087.8) (2459.4) 
Cash Flow 69.54 72.38 38.76 218.50 116.62 
 (389.6) (378.3) (166.3) (579.4) (373.5) 
Cash 890.23 871.11 266.22 1265.87 595.99 
 (1412.0) (1198.1) (696.1) (1947.5) (1188.8) 
Staff Headcount 3488.64 3252.71 1483.96 4295.80 2177.30 
 (4633.7) (4131.2) (2343.6) (5297.3) (3163.6) 
Age 15.63 14.28 10.45 18.28 14.45 
 (5.422) (5.047) (4.994) (5.047) (4.994) 






Table 1-3: Difference-in-differences (DID) Regressions 
Table 1-3a 
This table contains the results of estimating difference-in-differences regressions to 
investigate the effect of IPO on firms’ subsequent investment. after is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the observation is after 2012. treatment is an indicator variable that is one if the 
observation is part of the treatment group, i.e. firms that went public before the moratorium. 
treatment is equal to zero if the firm is in the control group, i.e., IPO applicant firms that applied 
to IPO before the moratorium whose IPO processes were delayed by the moratorium. 
after*treatment is the DID estimate. The variable of interest is InvestmentRate. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. The sample period covers 2011-2013. The table reports robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  InvestmentRate 
VARIABLES OLS Base Model OLS with Controls Time FE with Controls 
        
after*treatment 0.374** 0.364** 0.366** 
 (0.155) (0.158) (0.156) 
after 0.446*** 0.446***  
 (0.0833) (0.0867)  
treatment -0 0.0314  
 (3.13e-09) (0.0429)  
Constant 1*** 0.860*** 1.008*** 
 (5.43e-09) (0.204) -0.0458 
    
Observations 948 861 861 
R-squared 0.065 0.133 0.159 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No 






This table contains the results of estimating difference-in-differences regressions to 
investigate the effect of IPO on firms’ subsequent investment. after is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm is listed in that year. treatment is an indicator variable that is one if the 
observation is part of the treatment group, i.e. firms that went public before the moratorium. 
treatment is equal to zero if the firm is in the control group, i.e., IPO applicant firms that applied 
to IPO before the moratorium whose IPO processes were delayed by the moratorium. 
after*treatment is the DID estimate. The variable of interest is InvestmentRate. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. The sample period covers 2009-2015. The table reports robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  InvestmentRate 
VARIABLES OLS Base Model OLS with Controls Time FE with Controls 
        
after*treatment 0.401** 0.341* 0.354** 
 (0.189) (0.191) (0.179) 
after 0.734*** 0.754***  
 (0.126) (0.131)  
treatment -0.394*** -0.345***  
 (0.0771) (0.0834)  
Constant 1.356*** 1.109*** 0.788*** 
 (0.0653) (0.286) (0.110) 
    
Observations 1,733 1,581 1,581 
R-squared 0.073 0.121 0.175 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No 





This table contains the results of estimating difference-in-differences regressions to 
investigate the effect of IPO on firms’ subsequent investment. after is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the observation is after 2012. treatment is an indicator variable that is one if the 
observation is part of the treatment group, i.e. firms that went public before the moratorium. 
treatment is equal to zero if the firm is in the control group, i.e., IPO applicant firms that applied 
to IPO before the moratorium whose IPO processes were delayed by the moratorium. 
after*treatment, and is the DID estimate. The variable of interest is Fixed Investment over Total 
Assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample period covers 2011-2013. The table reports 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Fixed Investment Over Total Assets 
VARIABLES OLS Base Model OLS with Controls Time FE with Controls 
        
after*treatment 0.0480*** 0.0500*** 0.0417*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0123) 
after 0.00363 0.00406  
 (0.00584) (0.00626)  
treatment -0.00935 -0.0116  
 (0.00964) (0.00923)  
Constant 0.106*** 0.163*** 0.105*** 
 (0.00534) (0.0149) (0.00386) 
    
Observations 1,102 1,004 1,004 
R-squared 0.027 0.091 0.065 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No 




Table 1-4: Placebo Test Using 2014-listed Firms as the Treatment Group 
This table contains the results of estimating difference-in-differences regressions to 
investigate the effect of IPO on firms’ subsequent investment. time is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the observation is after 2014. treatment is an indicator variable that is one if the 
observation is listed during 2014. treatment is equal to zero if the firm is listed during 2015. DID 
is equal to time*treatment, and is the DID estimate. The variable of interest is InvestmentRate. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. The sample period covers 2009-2015. The table reports robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  InvestmentRate 
VARIABLES OLS Base Model OLS with Controls Firm FE Firm & Year FE 
          
DID 0.180 0.201 0.100 0.205 
 (0.236) (0.246) (0.221) (0.261) 
time 0.687*** 0.666*** 0.782*** 0.211 
 (0.172) (0.177) (0.156) (0.218) 
treatment -0.210* -0.0539   
 (0.117) (0.123)   
Constant 1.419*** 0.651* 1.328*** 1.001*** 
 (0.0870) (0.354) (0.0291) (0.0705) 
     
Observations 1,105 972 1,105 1,105 
R-squared 0.046 0.118 0.099 0.144 
Control Variables No Yes No No 
Firm FE No No Yes Yes 





Table 1-5: Compare Public Firms with the Control Group 
This table contains the results of estimating difference-in-differences regressions to 
investigate the effect of IPO on firms’ subsequent investment. time is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the observation is after 2012. treatment is an indicator variable that is one if the 
observation is part of the treatment group, i.e. firms that went public before the moratorium. 
treatment is equal to zero if the firm is in the control group, i.e. public companies listed before 
2012. DID is equal to time*treatment, and is the DID estimate. The variable of interest is 
InvestmentRate. All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample period covers 2011-2013. The 
table reports robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  InvestmentRate 
VARIABLES OLS Base Model OLS with Controls Firm FE Firm & Year FE 
          
DID 0.520*** 0.516*** 0.516*** 0.514*** 
 (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) 
time 0.300*** 0.291*** 0.305***  
 (0.0256) (0.0260) (0.0259)  
treatment 0 -0.0502**   
 (5.85e-09) (0.0219)   
Constant 1*** 0.952*** 0.997*** 0.997*** 
 (1.13e-09) (0.0542) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
     
Observations 6,243 5,975 6,243 6,243 
R-squared 0.027 0.046 0.045 0.058 
Controls No Yes No No 
Firm FE No No Yes Yes 






Table 1-6: DID Regressions on Firms’ Liabilities 
This table contains the results of estimating difference-in-differences regressions to 
investigate the effect of IPO on firms’ subsequent investment. time is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm is listed in that year. treatment is an indicator variable that is one if the 
observation is part of the treatment group, i.e. firms that went public before the moratorium. 
treatment is equal to zero if the firm is in the control group, i.e., IPO applicant firms that applied 
to IPO before the moratorium whose IPO processes were delayed by the moratorium. DID is equal 
to time*treatment, and is the DID estimate. The variable of interest is LiabilitiesRate. All variables 
are defined in Table 1. The sample period covers 2009-2015. The table reports robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  LiabilitiesRate 
VARIABLES OLS Base Model OLS with Controls Firm FE Firm & Year FE 
          
DID 0.105** 0.118** 0.0860* 0.227*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0489) (0.0469) (0.0628) 
time 0.307*** 0.288*** 0.325*** -0.237*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0323) (0.0310) (0.0422) 
treatment -0.238*** -0.185***   
 (0.0194) (0.0141)   
Constant 0.592*** 0.331*** 0.496*** 0.309*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0416) (0.00932) (0.0159) 
     
Observations 2,738 2,474 2,738 2,738 
R-squared 0.113 0.219 0.173 0.368 
Controls No Yes No No 
Firm FE No No Yes Yes 






As of Dec 12th 2012, an application has to meet the following conditions for a firm to be 
listed on the Main Board or Small & Medium Size Enterprise Board (SME): (1) the positive net 
profits and the cumulative net profits for the last three fiscal years exceed RMB 30 million; (2) the 
cumulative net cash flows for the last three fiscal years, as derived from the firm’s business 
operation, exceed RMB 50 million or the cumulative business revenues for the last three fiscal 
years exceed RMB 300 million; (3) the total value of stocks before the offering is no less than 
RMB 30 million; (4) the proportion of intangible assets (deducting land use rights, water-surface 
farming rights, mining rights and other rights) in its net assets at the end of the most recent fiscal 
period does not exceed 20%; and (5) no unrecovered losses existed at the end of the firm’s most 
recent fiscal period.  
For listing on the ChiNext Board, a firm that applies has to meet the following conditions: 
it must either (1) have generated profits for the last two consecutive years of a cumulative amount 
of no less than RMB10 million or (2) have generated net profits in the previous year of no less 
than RMB 5 million, have an operating income for the previous year of no less than RMB 50 
million and have an annual growth rate for the last two years of no less than 30%. Moreover, the 
ending net profit for the latest fiscal period must be no less than RMB 20 million, the firm must 
have no unrecovered losses, and the total value of its stocks after the offering must be no less than 
RMB 30 million. 
In practice, the CSRC often adopts tougher criteria than what is posted. For example, in 




million. The firms in my sample are aware of these unannounced criteria. The approval rate of the 
review meetings is high – the approval rate of IPOs between Jan. 1st 2012 and Nov. 3rd 2012 was 






The CSRC initially imposed the moratorium to protect retail investors by limiting the 
supply of new stocks. During the moratorium, near the end of 2013, the CSRC also toughened the 
screening process. A large proportion of the firms that stopped their IPO application during the 
moratorium did so because they could not fulfill the toughened requirements. This change in 
regulation may result in the control group being different than the treatment group. But as 
discussed in Section 2.3, the difference does not bias the decision to list ex ante and the possible 
ex post difference only biases against my result. 
Based on my conversations with officials in the CSRC, it seems that even the CSRC did 
not intend to have such a long moratorium, although there are no official documents that claim 
this. News articles indicate that throughout the first quarter of 2013 Chinese market participants 
expected that the IPO would resume soon. But the weak stock market performance concerned the 
CSRC. For example, in the middle of 2013, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index, the 
major stock index for Chinese markets, hit a historic low of 1849.65. 2013 also marked a dramatic 
change in the power structure within the Chinese Communist Party. The Twelfth National People’s 
Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference took place, in which the 
congresses formally elected the new leadership of China. Later, in Nov. 2013, in the Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the new leadership announced their comprehensive 
reform plans for the economy, including plans for stock market reforms. The weak stock market 
performance, the unprecedented number of IPO applicant firms, and the sensitive political 
environment all contributed to the CSRC’s caution in resuming IPOs. After the Third Plenary 











Zhejiang Shibao (002703) and NRB Corporation (002708) both belong to the auto parts 
industry. Their total assets in 2010 were similar -- Zhejiang Shibao had 811 million RMB in total 
assets and 282 million RMB in fixed assets. NRB Corporation had 602 billion RMB in total assets, 
and 155 billion RMB in fixed assets. These two companies also had similar history -- Zhejiang 
Shibao incepted on 6/2/1993, and NBR Corporation incepted on 1/8/1994. According to my 
collection of CSRC's review meetings, they both received initial feedback of their IPO application 
on 2/1/2012, suggesting that they applied to IPO around the same time. However, Zhejiang Shibao 
were listed on 11/2/2012, right before the moratorium, while NBR Corporation were affected by 
the moratorium, and did get to list until 1/21/2014. This result in a drastic difference of total assets 
and fixed assets between the two firms after the moratorium. In 2013, the year that Zhejiang Shibao 
got listed but NRB Corporation did not, Zhejiang Shibao had 1,314 million RMB in total assets 
and 436 million RMB in fixed assets. NRB Corporation had 796 billion RMB in total assets, and 
205 billion RMB in fixed assets. In other words, IPO enabled Zhejiang Shibao to increase its fixed 
assets by over 50% while NRB Corporation experienced almost no growth. 
 





Total Assets 1,051 1,073 1,314 2,101 1,886 
Fixed Assets 290 299 436 449 452 





Total Assets 658 722 796 1,129 1,116 
Fixed Assets 196 202 205 273 305 
FA_Growth 1.00 1.03 1.05 1.39 1.56 
 
1. FA_Growth = Fixed Assets of the year divided by Fixed Assets of 2011 
2. Unit in Millions of RMB 
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Chapter 2  
Discretionary Trading Halts, Liquidity and Catering 
Crocker Liu, Yuzheng Sun, Charles Trzcinka 
“Chinese stock market is a roach motel for capital.” 
–   Anne Yang, NY Times, September 9, 2015 
1. Introduction 
The Coasian definition of a financial exchange, such as a stock market, is the result of a 
firm creating a market in financial instruments where the firm’s products are prices of the 
instruments traded on the exchange. Accurate prices and liquidity are an outcome of the rules of 
trade, terms of the contracts, and the market’s mode of operation. In markets around the world, 
these are determined by the financial exchanges to maximize the accuracy and liquidity of prices. 
(see Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl, (1991)) However, in China the financial exchanges have been 
given the right to determine the rules of trading for the firms that create the securities traded. 
Specifically, firms that issue common stock can choose when and for how long a stock is 
suspended from trading in practice. The central question of this paper is what happens to the 
financial exchange when the suppliers to the financial exchange, that is, issuers of securities, have 
the right to change the rules of trading.  
If corporate managers take the market as informationally efficient, then trading suspensions 
are a tool for managing liquidity. However, recent research has suggested that arbitrage in 
securities markets is imperfect, and as a result, security prices can be too high or too low. The 
“market timing and catering” literature summarized by Baker and Wurgler (2013) studies how a 
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rational manager exploits the mispricing. The critical assumption is that the manager engages in 
activities that maximize the value of long-term shareholders. Arbitrage in the Chinese stock market 
is limited by widespread short-selling restrictions. This suggests that negative information will not 
have much impact on the stock price at least in the short run. If firms have managers who “cater” 
by maximizing the value of long-term shares, it is in the interest of firms to minimize the impact 
of short-term optimism. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) advance a catering theory of 
nominal share price where stock splits are a response to investor demand for securities in a price 
range. We suggest that stock suspensions may be a response to the same demand.  
The site of the most obvious effect of allowing firms to suspend trading is liquidity. 
Research in market microstructure has generally assumed that firms should minimize illiquidity; 
they have generally recognized that trading halts are a negligible fraction of trading. Transactions 
costs are routinely computed from actual transaction data. However, when the financial exchange 
gives firms the right to start and end trading halts at their own discretion, trading halts are at least 
a potentially important source of illiquidity especially if they are frequent, unpredictable and vary 
cross-sectionally. Several papers have concluded that the market for Ashares has a high degree of 
liquidity but these papers do not consider trading halts. (see Campello, Ribas, and Wang (2014); 
Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2017)).  
The site of the second effect of allowing firms to suspend stock is likely to be prices. First, 
the timing of trading halts may affect investor returns since investors should understand that the 
firm can suspend trading at any time. Those investors who need to trade may price securities lower.  
However, catering suggests that the prices of stocks that are suspended will move higher since 
firms are reducing the effect of trading on sentiment. Clearly, trading halts may add to the factors 
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that Allen, Qian, Shan, and Zhu (2015) argue change the return in the Chinese market relative to 
fundamentals.  
As a practical matter, trading halts in the Chinese stock market have long been a concern 
of foreign investors. For example, the ability of firms to impose trading halts has been and 
continues to be a major factor for Modern Index Strategy Indexes (MSCI) in its decision to exclude 
A shares from their emerging market portfolio indices. In response, the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission tightened the regulation of trading halts to reduce firms’ discretion in 
starting and ending trading halts, in an attempt to make A shares more acceptable to foreign 
investors in June 2016. Remarkably, this “tightening” limited discretionary trading halts to three 
months9.  
Using a unique data set of all trading halts in Chinese A shares from June 1999 to December 
2015, we investigate three basic questions of the unique market structure in China. First, are trading 
halts a significant source of illiquidity? Recognizing that in exchanges around the globe trading 
halts are rare and short, financial economists have generally not incorporated the probability of 
trading halts into transactions level measures of liquidity and use functions of bid-and-asked quotes 
as direct measures of the cost of trading. For example, in a study of 41 financial exchanges around 
the world from 1997 to 2007, Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2017) find that the global average of 
quoted spread over price is about 2.2% and trading suspensions are ignored. In their data and ours, 
the quoted spread over price for Chinese stocks is 0.15% of the price and is stable both cross-
sectionally and over time. To estimate the liquidity risk arising from trading halts, we construct a 
ratio of trading halt days over all trading days—representing the percentage of market activity that 





is halted—to compare with bid-ask spread over price. This ratio is 5% across our sample period 
and 9% in the most recent three years. It is clear that the transaction costs measures used in other 
studies give an inaccurate picture of a highly liquid Chinese stock market by not accounting for 
trading halts. The bid-ask spread is negligible compared to trading halts when measuring liquidity 
and transaction cost in the Chinese stock market. 
The second research question of this study is whether prices and widely available data 
contain information about the probability of trading halts. We use the bid-ask spread along with 
end-of-day price measures, such as the Amihud measure, the FHT measure of Fong, et al. (2017) 
and the high-low spread metric of Corwin-Schultz (2012) to determine whether there are investors 
who can predict trading halts. We find that in a hazard function, the lagged Corwin-Shultz measure, 
the FHT measure, and the Amihud measure are all statistically significant predictors of a future 
trading halt. Surprisingly, the bid-ask spread is not significant. The measures of transaction cost 
based on prices are clearly capturing more than the bid-ask spread. When we add accounting 
variables to the hazard function the liquidity measures still predict future trading halts, but the bid-
ask spread is significantly negative. The liquidity measures are clearly capturing information about 
future transactions costs—trading halts—that is completely missed by bid-asked spreads. This 
suggests that the bid-ask spread is set by poorly informed traders while prices contain some 
information about future trading halts. The accounting variables suggest that less profitable smaller 
firms with lower cash and current ratios that borrow more are more likely to halt trading. 
 The third research question of this study is whether trading halts are harmful or beneficial 
for investor wealth. We compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from five days before a 
trading halt until five days after a trading halt. The 1999–2012 period shows a “run-up and reversal” 
pattern: the CAR steadily increases before trading halts, and it reverses after trading halts. We 
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attribute this pattern to a number of factors: as the market overreacts to news,  firms use trading 
halts to reduce asymmetric information, cool down the market, and dampen price volatility. 
However, the 2013–2015 period shows that trading halts increase returns after the halt. Both 
periods clearly show that firms use trading halts to trade off liquidity for better information quality 
and lower volatility for longer-term investors.  
Since firms are the decision-makers for trading halts, we study the interaction of firm 
characteristics and trading halts with the Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) catering theory 
as a guide. We first examine which characteristics affect the firms’ likelihood of receiving trading 
halts. In particular, we analyze the role of financial constraints as a potential catalyst in trading 
halts. We find that firms that are more likely to be financially constrained, namely, firms with less 
assets, less profits-to-assets ratio, less-cash-to-assets ratio, less cash flow-to-assets ratio, more 
leverage, and more earning volatility-to-cash flow volatility ratio have a higher propensity to 
implement trading halts. These characteristics are also significant predictors in hazard estimation, 
where a greater likelihood of financial constraints is associated with higher risk of implementing 
trading halts. This result provides evidence that is consistent with our hypothesis that ex ante, the 
higher propensity of a trading halt is linked to the more financial constraints of the firm.  
Using the same characteristics, we sort firms into five quintiles. We compute the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around trading halts for different quintiles. We confirm that 
the “run-up and reversal” pattern holds at all quintiles. The quintile study also finds that more 
financially constrained firms have steeper reversals after trading halts. Specifically, firms with less 
profit, less cash flow, less cash, and less assets have a steeper decline in CAR after trading halts. 
Following our previous interpretation of the “run-up and reverse” pattern as firms trading liquidity 
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for better information and less volatility, we conclude that more financially constrained firms’ 
trading halts have a larger impact in reducing volatility and asymmetric information. 
The uniqueness of our data and the scope of our analyses enable us to make several 
contributions to the literature. First, we provide the first complete statistical description of trading 
halts in the Chinese stock market. We show that trading halts play a far more important role than 
the bid-ask spread in measuring liquidity. A second contribution is that bid-ask spread estimators 
based on functions of the end of day prices provide more information than in the bid-ask spread. 
Our result suggests that future studies should reconsider the information difference between price 
impact measure and quote measures, especially when trading halts exist as a significant form of 
liquidity risk. Third, we find that when firms have the discretion to reduce liquidity, they do so 
extensively. By decreasing liquidity via trading halts, firms can improve information and reduce 
volatility. By letting the firms decide on when to halt trading, the Chinese financial markets have 
effectively decided that accurate prices are more important than liquidity.  
 Our result sheds light on the recent debate over the effectiveness of the stock market (Bond, 
Edmans, & Goldstein, 2012; Zingales, 2015). Finally, finding that financially constrained firms 
use trading halts differently, our paper provides additional insights into how corporate finance 
decisions can affect investors. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relevant 
institutional details of trading halts in China and describe our data. We also report summary 
statistics to compare trading halts with the bid-ask spread. In Section 3 we outline the hazard model 
we use to study the determinants of trading halts, and we display the results of the model. Section 
4 explores the effect of trading halts on CAR while Section 5 focuses on the association of firm 
characteristics, in particular financial constraint proxies, to the likelihood of trading halts and CAR 
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around trading halts. Recognizing that this analysis mostly documents correlations, we discuss the 
opportunities and challenges that remain for future research and conclude in Section 6. 
2. Data and Institutional Details 
Our data include information on stock trades, firm characteristics, and trading halts. Both 
the source of data and relevant institutional details of trading halts are provided below as well as 
relevant details of the Chinese stock market. This section also includes a brief comparison between 
bid-ask spread and trading halts to demonstrate that, in the Chinese stock market, trading halts is 
the more important source of illiquidity than the bid-ask spread. 
2.1 Trading Information and Firm Characteristics 
Most of our information on trades is from GTA Information Technology’s China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database except for daily bid price and daily ask price, 
which is obtained from Thomson Reuter’s Datastream. Both data from CSMAR and data from 
Datastream are at daily frequency. 
Firm characteristics are also obtained from CSMAR at quarterly frequency, and we take 
the yearly average.  
2.2 Trading Halts 
Our data contains the historical record of Chinese trading halts provided by Wind Financial 
Terminal (WFT).10 The data from WFT in China is analogous to the data available from Bloomberg, 
Datastream and Compustat. It serves more than 90% of financial enterprises in the Chinese market 
                                                 
10 We thank School of Hotel Administration at Cornell University for the purchase of this data. 
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and over 75% of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors.11 The historical record of trading halts 
from the Wind Financial Terminal’s data center was obtained via a special request. The Wind data 
is a survivor-bias-free database that covers both active and inactive stocks. Our sample covers all 
trading halts that are greater than or equal to one day in length, from June 1999 to December 2015, 
for both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We exclude intraday trading halts from our 
sample, most of which are automatic halts due to abnormal price movements. 12 
We  hand-collect trading halts data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) website for 
the period from June 2009 to December 2013 to cross check the accuracy of the WFT dataset.13 
Out of the 24,878 suspension records from SSE data, 83.58% or 20,794, are included in the WFT 
sample. We randomly select a few trading halts that are not covered in the WFT sample. Either the 
trading halts turned out to be intraday halts or alternately, there was no halt on that particular day. 
A random check of trading halts in the WFT sample matches the SSE website. This exercise 
suggests that the WFT sample is a reliable source for trading halts data. 
According to “Trading Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange” and “Trading Rules of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange”, the stock exchanges initiate trading halts. However, firms can apply 
for trading halts and the requests are automatically granted. On the other hand, when firms do not 
apply for trading halts, the exchange seldom initiates them. Furthermore, the exchanges do not set 
                                                 
11 http://www.wind.com.cn/En/aboutus.html. 
12 For example, if a stock has hit the return ceiling or floor (10% of ordinary stocks, 5% for special treatment 
(ST) stocks) for three consecutive days, the exchange will halt the stock’s trading at the beginning of the next 
trading day for an hour.  
13 The SSE website suspension record is only available since June 2009. 
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deadlines for ending trading halts. Thus, in most cases, the timing and length of the trading halt 
(start and end of trading halts) is at the discretion of the individual firms. The exceptions are part 
of code 7 trading halts, which are trading halts related to risk warnings; and part of code 4 trading 
halts, which are transaction related trading halts. They represent a very small portion of the total 
number of halted stock-days: there are 2,040 code 7 halted stock-days and 1,793 code 4 halted 
stock-days, out of 189,072 halted stock-days in total, a 2.03%. 
In May 2016, the CSRC published new regulations which capped halts at three months for 
major asset restructuring and one month during private placements. The bourses will have the right 
to reject trading-halt applications under extreme market circumstances14. Although the news is 
outside of our sample period, it provides an anecdotal evidence about how arbitrary trading halts 
in the Chinese stock market were, and the degree of freedom that firms have to conduct trading 
halts. The fact that firms have discretion to initiate trading halts lead to two implications: First, 
when liquidity is a choice, firms do voluntarily choose to worsen their own liquidity. Second, since 
trading halts are not forced upon on firms by the regulatory agencies, the frequent trading halts are 
likely to be an outcome of market equilibrium.  
When a trading halt occurs, the firm is required to announce the reason for the trading halt. 
Although the CSRC specifies the conditions under which trading halts can or need to happen, there 
is no strict format for firms to follow. We examined the guidelines from the CSRC’s regulation as 
well as read the reasons given for the trading halts to categorize the types of trading halts. We 
classify the reasons for trading halts into nine categories based on keywords contained in the 
reports. Table 1 lists the categories as well as the Chinese keywords used.  






Of the nine reasons given, we need to differentiate code 1, code 4 and code 5. Code 1 
represents trading halts due to shareholder meetings and code 4 represents trading halts due to 
transaction related reasons, which are usually scheduled or predictable. Code 5 represents trading 
halts due to split share reform that happened around 2005 and 2006. Campello, Ribas, and Wang 
(2014) provide a detailed discussion of the split share reform. It is a one-time, special event with 
different motivations relative to other trading halts. Therefore, we provide two sets of analysis, one 
including all types of trading halts, and one excluding trading halts with code 1, code 4 and code 
5.  
In Figure 1, we give an overview of trading halts decomposed by year, month, code and 
length. We separately represent code 1 (shareholder meeting) trading halts, code 5 (2005-2006 
recapitalization) trading halts and all other trading halts by using different colors. There are a few 
obvious patterns. First, the number of trading halts grows dramatically at the end of the sample.  
Although year 2005 to 2008 saw a sharp increase of trading halts, the increase is largely associated 
with code 5 (split share) trading halts. (see Campello et al. (2014),). The trading halts in 2013 were 
doubled in 2014 and doubled again in 2015, almost all due to code 2 (important matters) trading 
halts. Figure 1b shows that the summer months have a disproportionate share of the halts but there 




Figure 1c show the trading halt by codes. The CSRC revised its rules in July 2012 canceling 
code 1 trading halts due to shareholder meetings 15  and code 4 trading halts, halts that are 
transaction related.  
Trading halts due to “important matters” (code 2), has the most total length of trading halts. The 
language of “important matters” is intentionally vague enabling firms to provide an arbitrary 
reason(s) to initiate trading halts. For example, during the stock market meltdown in mid-2015, 
almost half of stocks in A shares were halted, which attracted global attention16. In that episode, 
“important matters” accounted for the majority of the disclosed reasons are. Thus, the frequency 
and total length of code 2 trading halts provide another view of how much discretion firms have 
in terms of conducting trading halts. 
 Figure 1d shows trading halts by length. The most frequent is one day but there are many 
over eleven days. We examine the length more carefully in the next section.  
2.3 Trading Halts vs. Bid-Ask Spread 
To compare the liquidity impact of trading halts relative to the bid-ask spread, we construct 
a ratio of halted stock-day observations over all trading stock-day observations. This ratio is 5% 
over our sample period. We view this ratio as the percentage of market activity that is halted. One 
can compare this ratio with the bid-ask spread over the daily closing price, which equals 0.15%. 
Table 2 provides the distribution of these variables, with the addition of other variables such as 
HaltLength – the total number of halted activity trading days for each trading halt. It is worth 





nothing that the average HaltLength is 5.26 days, a sharp contrast to the predominately-intraday 
halts in the US market. 
Table 2-2 
 Panel B shows the trading halts from 1999 to 2012. In 2012 the Chinese regulators ended 
the practice of requiring trading halts for shareholder meetings so that Code 1 trading halts 
disappeared. The mean level of  suspension which is the halted stock days over all stock trading 
days is 3.5% with a mean level of HaltLength of 3.1 days, with trading halts of 4 days or longer 
accounting for 10% of the sample. In contrast, the last three years of the sample have many more 
halts and for longer periods. The number of stock days halted is 8.58% with the average 
HaltLenght of 20.6 days.  Trading halts of 66 days or longer account for 10% of the sample. 
Table 2 clearly shows that the past three years look very different than the previous fourteen and 
we will examine them separately for much of this paper.  
2.4 Liquidity Proxies, Trading Variables and Accounting Variables 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the variables we use to examine our research 
questions. The liquidity measures from the literature are the bid-asked spread measures of Corwin-
Shultz high-low measure and FHT; the Amihud price impact measure; trading variables price and 
volume. For our firm-level tests we use accounting variables at an annual frequency: total assets, 
net profit, cash flow, cash balance and leverage. Table 3 displays all the variables and their 
definitions;  
Table 2-3 
Most price impact measures and quote measures are designed to proxy for liquidity. 
Therefore, it is important to ensure that each variable brings new information, rather than creating 
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redundant information under different names. Panel A of Table 3 presents the correlation of all 
liquidity proxies and trading variables used in this paper. In the correlation matrix, the highest 
correlation is only 0.35, between daily price and daily volume. All the liquidity proxies have very 
low correlation among themselves, especially the bid-ask spread, where the highest absolute 
correlation with all other variables is only 0.05. The low correlations further support the view that 
the bid-ask spread is an insufficient metric to capture all the liquidity risk in the Chinese stock 
market. 
Comparing all the liquidity measures, the bid-ask spread stands out for its low variation. 
The standard deviation of the bid-ask spread is 0.021, but it is mostly driven by a few outliers. 
When we trim the data at 1% and 99%, the standard deviation of the bid-ask spread shrinks to 
0.0102, with a mean of 0.0103. The majority observations of the bid-ask spread stays constant at 
0.01, which is the tick size for the Chinese stock market. 
In our sample, the average firm’s leverage, defined as total debt to total book asset, is 0.589 , 
which is drastically above the United States average of 0.29 from 1950 to 2003 reported by Frank 
and Goyal (2009).  
3. The Hazard Estimation 
The second research question of this study is whether a trading halt can be predicted from 
variables available to investors. If information about trading halts is leaked to the market before 
the trading occurs, the prices, spread and volume should reflect it. We will test the hypothesis of 
information leakage by estimating a hazard model.  
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3.1 The Hazard Model 
We use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the propensity of a stock to receive a 
trading halt. While a traditional hazard model is used to analyze survivorship when only one failure 
is observed, in our setting, the trading of one stock can be halted multiple times. Thus, failure times, 
or trading halts, are correlated within a stock, violating the independence of failure times 
assumption in traditional survival analysis. To address this issue, we use a “variance-corrected” 
model that adjusts the covariance matrix to account for the additional correlation. More specifically, 
let 𝑋𝑘𝑖 and 𝐶𝑘𝑖 be the failure and censoring time of the kth trading halts (k=1,….,K) in the ith stock 
(i=1,…,m), and let 𝑍𝑘𝑖 be a p-vector of possible time-dependent covariates, for ith stock with 
respect to the kth trading halt. Assume that 𝑋𝑘𝑖  and 𝐶𝑘𝑖  are independent, conditional on the 
covariates vector (𝑍𝑘𝑖 ). Define 𝑇𝑘𝑖 = min (𝑋𝑘𝑖; 𝐶𝑘𝑖) and 𝛿𝑘𝑖 = 𝐼(𝑋𝑘𝑖 ≤ 𝐶𝑘𝑖) , and let 𝛽 be a p-
vector of unknown regression coefficients. Under the Cox proportional hazard assumption, the 
hazard function of the ith stock for the kth trading halt is 
𝜆𝑘(𝑡; 𝑍𝑘𝑖) = 𝜆0(𝑡)𝑒
𝑍𝑘𝑖𝛽 (1) 
The Cox’s partial likelihood function, 𝐿(𝛽), obtains maximum likelihood estimates of 𝛽. 
D. Lin (1994) showed that the estimator ?̂? is a consistent estimator for 𝛽 and is asymptotically 





However, it does not take into account the additional correlation in the data. D. Y. Lin and 
Wei (1989) proposed a modification to estimate a robust variance-covariance matrix: 
𝑉 = 𝐼−1𝑈′𝑈𝐼−1 (3) 
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where U is a 𝑚×𝑝 matrix of group efficient score residuals, assuming the observations are 
divided into m independent groups, which, in our case, are individual stocks.  
Table 2-4 
With the corrected standard error that accounts for the serial correlation within each 
individual stock, Table 4 Panel A displays the result of the hazard estimation using the liquidity 
variables. In the estimation, we use lagged price impact proxies as 𝑍𝑘𝑖, with the bid-ask spread and 
trading variables used as control variables. The coefficient for all liquidity measures – Corwin’s 
high-low spread, FHT and Amihud – are all significantly positive. This result suggests that the 
price impact measures can predict trading halts in the Chinese stock market even after controlling 
for the bid-ask spread and trading variables. What is surprising is that the bid-ask spread itself has 
no predictive power. FHT (2016) show that the end of day bid-ask spread that we are using is the 
best possible estimator for transactions-level bid asked spreads. The liquidity measures which were 
developed to estimate the transactions level bid-ask spread are clearly capturing more information 
about future trading halts than the spread itself. This suggests that the transactions-level spread has 
less information than each of these liquidity measures which are different functions of prices and 
volume. Our conclusion is that there is information in the marketplace about future trading halts 
but these informed investors are not setting the spread.  
The significance and even the size of the variable in Table 4 Panel A does not change in 
Panel B which estimates the hazard function using accounting variables. The one exception to this 
rule is that the bid-ask spread is now significant but with a negative sign—larger spreads predict 
less trading halts when higher levels of all liquidity measures—indicating more transactions 
costs—predict more trading halts.  
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The accounting variables suggest that less profitable smaller firms with lower cash and 
current ratios who borrow more are more likely to halt trading. We explore what this means for 
investor returns in the next section of the paper.  
4. Trading Halt and Return 
In this section, we focus on understanding the reasoning behind firms’ decision to reduce 
the liquidity of their stocks. We investigate the impact of trading halts on investors, by using an 
event study approach to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) around trading halts. 
We employ the following procedure: In each active trading day 𝑡, we calculate the return for stock 
𝑖, 𝑅𝑖𝑡, and obtain market return 𝑀𝑅𝑡 from CSMAR. The abnormal return for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, 
then follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑀𝑅𝑡 (4) 
It is worth nothing that when stock 𝑖 is halted on day 𝑡 , its return 𝑅𝑖𝑡 becomes zero. We still 
calculate its abnormal return by negating the market return. This measures the opportunity cost of 
not being able to trade. If the market is positive the abnormal return will be the inability to obtain 
at least market returns, if the market return is negative, the abnormal return will reflect avoiding a 
falling market.  
We start 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  as 1 from 5 days before a trading halt, then 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  accumulates the 
abnormal returns:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) (5) 
Again, since we calculate 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 even when the stock’s trading is halted, Equation (5) means that, 
CAR will keep accumulating even if the trading halt last for days. Thus, if firms on average choose 
 72 
 
to strategically halt their trading when the market performs well or when the market performs 
poorly, the CAR will reflect that trend.  
Some special cases exist of consecutive trading halts that are less than 10 days apart from 
each other for the same stock. In those situations, we assign a higher priority for closer dates. For 
example, if a trading day is 3 days after a trading halt, A, and 2 days before the next trading halt, 
B, it will be considered as -2 day to trading halt B. We also mark the code and length for each 
trading halt, and this trading day will be considered as belonging to trading halts with the same 
type as B. 
Figure 2 displays the CAR around trading halts. In Figure 2, the pattern of the CAR around 
a trading halt is very distinct. We name this pattern “run-up and reversal”. The CAR experiences 
a run-up before a trading halt, and then reverts back to the original value after the trading halt.  Our 
quintile study in Section 5 confirms that this pattern persists in almost all quintiles. When we 
exclude code 1 trading halts and code 5 trading halts, the pattern persists. However, the CAR is 
higher on average. Also, on the 5th day after trading halts, the average CAR is 1.017, representing 
a 1.7% return over the original value. Therefore, an average investor can benefit from buying 
before trading halts and selling around trading halts. She can also lose from buying around trading 
halts and selling after trading halts. Meanwhile, a long-term investor may not care about trading 
halts in general since it has little long-term effect. 
Figure 2-2 
In general, the previous literature argues that trading halts reduce the asymmetric 
information in the market by giving investors more time to digest news (Chen, Chen, & Valerio, 
2003; Corwin & Lipson, 2000; Greenwald & Stein, 1991; Kodres & O'Brien, 1994). Our result 
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provides fresh evidence supporting this view. The run-up of the CAR before trading halts suggests 
that the market either receives or anticipates news, or rumors, before trading halts. However, after 
the trading halts, the stock return almost always decreases, which suggests that after trading halts, 
the market is less optimistic about the news or completely discounts it and therefore the return falls 
back to its original level. It seems that trading halts, by reducing asymmetric information and 
allowing investors to have more time to think, serves intuitively as a thermostat cooling down the 
market and thus reducing volatility, while still maintaining a positive return. In a market where 
retail investors predominate (see appendix), reducing asymmetric information and price volatility 
have a significant economic and social impact.  
The result that trading halts are associated with positive return and lower volatility also 
strengthens our argument that the amount of trading halts in the Chinese stock market is an 
equilibrium outcome rather than a regulatory artifact. In Section 2, we argue this point based on 
institutional details. In this section, we provide evidence that there exist opposite marketing forces 
which make trading halts attractive to some while harmful to others. Trading halts, by their nature, 
reduce the liquidity of stocks and are harmful to investors who would have traded during the halt. 
Therefore, in order for trading halts to be an equilibrium outcome, they should compensate 
investors elsewhere for investors’ loss of liquidity. Our results show that investors who stay in the 
market from five days before the halt until five days after benefit from lower volatility and positive 
return. However, the benefit is not universal. If an investor purchases a stock right before a trading 
halt, she will be harmed both by reduced liquidity and by negative return. Furthermore, because 
firms can choose when to halt trading, there can be differential effects among different firms arising 




5. Trading Halts and Financial Constraints 
In this section, we first study what firm characteristics are associated with a higher 
likelihood of implementing trading halts. We next extend the analysis in Section 4 by studying the 
differential effects of trading halts on CAR in each quintile groups to further our understanding of 
why firms voluntarily choose to reduce the liquidity of their stocks. 
We study the interaction of financial constraints with respect to trading halts, since financial 
constraints are one of the central topics of finance, and it links the capital market to the real 
economy (Campbell, Dhaliwal, & Schwartz, 2012). Our results suggest that the discretionary 
trading halts are the firms’ reaction to asymmetric information in the market. They represent the 
firms’ trade-off between liquidity and volatility. Financially constrained firms are under more 
pressure to do so, as their investors are more likely to be sensitive to news. 
The corporate finance literature offers many indexes of financial constraints, such as the 
investment sensitivity of cash-flow (FHP measure) from (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, & 
Poterba, 1988), the KZ index of developed by Lamont, Polk, and Saaá-Requejo (2001) based on 
the text-based results from Kaplan-Zingales (1997), the HP index by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) 
updated the KZ index using a new text-based sample, the WW index of (Whited & Wu, 2006), and 
the cash-flow sensitivity of cash Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), among others. 
However, using these indexes usually come with strong assumptions, such as the estimated 
coefficients being stable across time and industries. Such assumption is unlikely to hold when we 
apply them to the Chinese firms, who have drastically different characteristics than the firms in 
the United States.  
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However, when calculating difference indexes, different results generally find the same 
sign of loading on different firm characteristics. For example, the KZ index finds that the 
likelihood of financial constraints correlates positively with market-to-book, leverage, and 
negatively with cash flow, dividends and cash; similarly, HP index loads negatively on size, 
positively on size-squared, and negatively on age; WW index loads negatively on cash flow to 
asset, a dummy that indicates whether the firm pays dividend, size, sales growth, and positively 
on long-term debt to total assets and industry sales-growth. Therefore, the literature suggests that 
larger firms, firms with more profit, more cash flow, more cash balance and firms with less 
leverage are less likely to be financially constrained. In this section, we use these firm 
characteristics, along with earning smoothness –a measure commonly used in the accounting 
literature to proxy for earning manipulation – to test the hypothesis that more financially 
constrained firms use more trading halts, and the consequences of their trading halts are relatively 
more significant to investors. 
For each firm, we take its accounting variables from its annual financial statements, and 
sort firms into one of the five quintiles for each year. Because we classify each quintile as having 
firms that meet the characteristic of the quintile, we allow firms to switch quintiles based on their 
yearly accounting numbers. Therefore, quintile 1 represents the firms that are most likely to be 
financially constrained within a given year, specifically, firms with less profit, less cash, less cash 
flow, less asset, more leverage and more earning smoothness. Quintile 5 represents the firms that 
are least likely to be financially constrained in that year. Over the entire sample, every quintile has 
the same number of firms. We sum the total number of halted days within each quintile, and report 
the result in Table 5. Table 5 displays an almost monotonic decrease in the total number of halted 
days, from more financially constrained firms to less financially constrained firms. This result 
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suggests that more financially constrained firms tend to implement trading halts with greater total 
length. 
Having established the link between financial constraints and trading halts, we next explore 
whether differential effects of trading halts exist for firms having different levels of financial 
constraints. We replicate the test of Figure 2 for firms with different quintiles. Table 6 shows the 
CAR for different quintiles based on the different characteristics. For ease of eyeballing, we report 
CAR-1 instead of CAR. 
For all characteristics, we first observe the “run-up and reversal” pattern, with CAR-1 above 
0 for all Day-1 observations across all quintiles, but with a less magnitude on the fifth day after 
trading halts. This result confirms that the nature of trading halts persists for different kind of firms. 
Second, almost all characteristics, have steeper decreases of CAR after trading halts for quintile 1, 
and a smoother decrease of CAR after trading halts for quintile 5. The change in slope is also 
monotonic across quintiles. There is no obvious difference across quintiles before trading halts. 
This pattern suggests that when facing similar news and imposing similar actions, the trading halts 
of more financially constrained firms have a relatively larger impact on the market, pushing the 
return back to the original level faster, compared to the trading halts of less financially constrained 
firms. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Our paper examines the consequences of a financial exchange giving firms the right to 
suspend trading in their common stock. Using data from 1999-2015 and focusing only on 
suspensions of one day or longer, we document that 5% of stock-trading days are suspended. We 
find that these suspensions are not predicted by the bid-ask spread but are predicted by measures 
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developed to estimate liquidity, specifically, the Corwin-Shultz high low measure, the FHT 
measure and the Amihud measure. Firms in China appear to be trading liquidity for price 
appreciation since these trading halts increase cumulative abnormal returns for longer term 
investors. Finally, financially constrained firms are more likely to use trading halts, and their 





Figure 2-1: Distribution of Trading Halts 
The sample includes 62,490 Chinese A shares trading halts (of varying lengths) between June 1999 and 
December 2015. Panel A presents the sum of halted days by different code. Panel B presents the sum of 
halted days by year. Panel C presents the sum of halted days by month. Panel D presents the frequency of 









Figure 2-2: Variables of Interest Surrounding Trading Halts 
The sample includes 57,036 Chinese A shares trading halts between June 1999 and December 2013. Figure 
2 presents the daily mean of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for five days before trading halts and five 
days after trading halts. Trading halts are treated as day 0, regardless of the length. Blue bars represent 
untrimmed data, and red bars represent data trimmed at 1% and 99%. The figures also present confidence 
interval at 95%. Figure 2a includes data for the whole sample. Figure 2b excludes trading halts due to code 








Table 2-1: Definitions 
Table 2-1a 
Code, Reason and Keywords of Chinese A-Shares Trading Halts 
The table provides the associated reason for each code of trading halts, as well as the keywords used to 
identify each reason. Each trading halt in the sample contains start day, end day, and the reasons for the 
halt. Based on the official regulations, we assign the reasons into nine categories based on the keyword 






































































































































































































         









































Definitions of Variables 
The table provides the definition of the variables used in this paper. The price, volume, and accounting data 
are obtained from CSMAR; the bid-ask spread is obtained from Datastream. 
 
Variable Names Definition 
Liquidity Variables 
CS_0 The non-negative high-low spread from Corwin and Shultz (2011) 
FHT_m Measure developed by Fong, Holden and Trzcinka (2016) 
baspread Bid-ask spread: ask minus bid 
amihud Absolute daily return over daily volume 
Trading Variables 
dnvaltrd Daily level of volume 
Daily_Return Daily return 
Price Comparable closing price with dividend reinvested 
delta_volume Daily volume change 
Accounting Variables 
ProfitRatio Net profit / total assets 
CashRatio Cash holding / total assets 
CashFlowRatio Cash flow / total assets 
TotalAssets Total assets 
Leverage Total liabilities / total assets 
CurrentRatio Current assets / Current liabilities 




Table 2-2: Summary Statistics for Comparing Bid-Ask Spread and Trading Halts 
The table lists information to compare bid-ask spread with trading halts. clsprc is the 
nominal daily closing price. Suspension is a dummy that equals to 0 for non-halted stock-day 
observations and equals to 1 for halted stock-day observations. Haltlength is a variable that equals 
to the number of halted trading days at the beginning of a trading halt, and is empty for the rest of 
the observations. Baspread is the daily ask price minus the daily bid price. Baspreadoverp is the 
bid-ask spread over the nominal daily closing price. 
Panel A, 1999-2015 
VARIABLES  N Mean SD 1% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
clsprc 6,341,577 13.35 12.31 2.3 6.49 10.06 15.89 25.26 34 
suspension 6,669,781 0.0493 0.216 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HaltLength 62,490 5.261 17.72 1 1 1 1 9 23 
baspread 5,998,718 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
baspreadoverp 5,998,710 0.0013 0.0016 0.0000 0.0003 0.0009 0.0017 0.0028 0.0037 
                    
Panel B, 1999-2012 
VARIABLES  N Mean SD 1% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
clsprc 4,652,660 12.36 10.81 2.23 6.21 9.55 14.88 22.98 30.37 
suspension 4,822,854 0.0353 0.185 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HaltLength 54,879 3.133 13.51 1 1 1 1 4 12 
baspread 4,393,263 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
baspreadoverp 4,393,255 0.0013 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0018 0.0029 0.0039 
                    
Panel C, 2013-2015 
VARIABLES  N Mean SD 1% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
clsprc 1,688,917 16.07 15.39 2.56 7.35 11.72 19.11 31.44 41.81 
suspension 1,846,927 0.0858 0.28 0 0 0 0 0 1 
HaltLength 7,611 20.6 31.56 1 3 6 24 66 90 
baspread 1,605,455 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 




Table 2-3: Summary Statistics for Trading Variables, Liquidity Variables and Accounting 
Variables of the A-Shares Stocks 
The table lists summary information for all A-share stocks, from June 1999 to December 
2015. Panel A presents the correlation of the liquidity variables. Panel B summarizes the trading 
variables, the liquidity variables and the accounting variables. The trading variables and liquidity 
variables are at daily frequency, and the accounting variables are at yearly frequency. 
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Market Variables 
 CS_0 FHT_m BASpread Amihud Price Daily_Return ∆_Volume 
FHT_m -0.01       
BASpread -0.01 0      
Amihud -0.08 0.05 0.05     
Price 0.02 -0.12 0.04 -0.16    
Daily_Return 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.02   
Delta_Volume -0.01 0 0 0.01 -0.01 0.25  
Volume 0.11 -0.05 0 -0.25 0.35 0.09 0.12 
 
 














CashRatio 0.34      
Delta_CashRatio 0.17 0.15     
OperatingCashFlo
wRatio 0.3 0.04 0.25    
TotalAssets 0 -0.05 0.03 0.04   
Leverage -0.42 -0.41 0.04 -0.09 0.22  








Panel C: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES N Mean SD 5% 50% 95% 
CS_0 6,276,196 0.0074 0.0119 0 0 0.0332 
FHT_m 6,601,154 0.0019 0.0011 0 0.0018 0.0039 
baspread 5,946,425 0.0103 0.0102 0 0.01 0.03 
amihud 6,278,162 0.0016 0.0031 0 0.0005 0.0076 
              
Price 6,214,747 45.23 65.69 6.81 25.23 147.41 
Daily_Return 6,214,786 0.001 0.028 -0.046 0.001 0.049 
delta_volume 6,151,348 -941,242 46,360,600 
-
67,038,200 -363,172 64,196,800 
dnvaltrd 6,214,747 81,763,200 142,595,000 1,827,000 28,625,100 356,251,000 
              
ProfitRatio 6,535,814 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.08 
CashRatio 6,530,569 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.14 0.44 
OperatingCashFlow 
Ratio 6,535,681 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.11 
TotalAssets 
(Thousand) 6,535,705 6,164,430 16,718,600 457,844 1,949,320 22,478,700 
Leverage 6,535,370 0.469 0.21 0.13 0.469 0.813 






Table 2-4: Hazard Estimation 
The table is the hazard estimation. We estimate a proportional hazard function with time-
varying covariates: 𝜆𝑖(𝑡, 𝑥𝑖(𝑡)) = 𝜆0(𝑡)ⅇ
𝑥𝑖(𝑡)
′𝛽. Because there can be multiple failures for each 
firm, we cluster the standard errors at stock level. Panel A presents the regression including all 
liquidity measures lagged at one day. Panel B presents the regression including all liquidity 
measures lagged at three days. Panel B presents the regression with different account variables. 
Panel C combines daily liquidity measures and annual accounting variables. Sample period is from 
June 1999 to December 2015. 
 
 
Panel A:  One-day Lag 
VARIABLES      
            
lag1_CS_0 1.974*** 2.366***    
 (0.331) (0.300)    
lag1_FHT_m 19.59***  4.919   
 (3.413)  (3.442)   
lag1_baspread -0.508   -0.477  
 (0.429)   (0.426)  
lag1_amihud 0.232***    0.0402*** 
 (0.0361)    (0.00709) 
      




Panel B:  Three-days Lag 
VARIABLES      
            
lag3_CS_0 2.273*** 1.753***    
 (0.336) (0.315)    
lag3_FHT_m 18.54***  5.301   
 (3.404)  (3.396)   
lag3_baspread -0.0140   0.0463  
 (0.309)   (0.305)  
lag3_amihud 0.224***    0.0496*** 
 (0.0381)    (0.00723) 
      




Panel C:  Accounting Variables 
VARIABLES        
lag1_CS_0 1.912*** 1.974*** 1.970*** 1.977*** 1.894*** 1.972*** 2.021*** 
 (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) 
lag1_FHT_m 15.59*** 19.58*** 16.46*** 19.82*** 20.15*** 19.54*** 18.11*** 
 (3.312) (3.412) (3.301) (3.517) (3.452) (3.410) (3.280) 
lag1_baspread (0.58) (0.51) (0.48) (0.48) (0.52) (0.51) (0.66) 
 (0.453) (0.429) (0.436) (0.421) (0.431) (0.429) (0.460) 
lag1_amihud 0.243*** 0.232*** 0.229*** 0.240*** 0.231*** 0.232*** 0.232*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0361) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0361) 
ProfitRatio 0.0013*** -0.002***      
 (0.00045) (0.00075)      
CashRatio -0.986***  -0.81***     
 (0.0899)  (0.0771)     
CashFlowRatio 1.555***   0.946***    
 (0.121)   (0.0939)    
TotalAssets -0**    -0**   
 (0)    (0)   
Leverage 0.0054***     0.0056***  
 (0.00170)     (0.00158)  
smoothness 0.109***      0.125*** 
 (0.0192)      (0.0207) 
        





Table 2-5: Sum of HaltLengh by Different Firm Characteristics Quintiles 
The table lists the sum of HaltLength by different firm characteristics quintiles. The 
quintiles are organized so quintile 1 contains the firms that are expected to have the most trading 
halts, such as smaller firms, firms with lower cash balance, firms with lower cash flow, high 
earning volatility firms, etc.  
 
Sum of HaltLength by Quintiles 
Quintiles  ProfitRatio Cash Ratio Cash Flow Ratio Total Assets -Leverage -Smoothness 
1     90,966      80,921              67,621        88,244     72,184        63,479  
2     61,246      61,212              66,043        69,492     62,624        59,230  
3     55,282      61,911              68,068        58,250     60,891        61,187  
4     57,803      60,361              59,262        54,336     60,211        61,647  





Table 2-6: Cumulative Abnormal Return by Days to Trading Halts 
The table tabulates (CAR_Halts – 1) for halted days, the first day after halts, and the fifth 
day after halts. CAR_Halts is defined in Equation (5). The results are sorted into 5 quintiles of 
financial constrain proxies. Quintile 1 group is most likely to be financially constrained, having 
least profit ratio, cash ratio, cash flow ratio, total assets, and highest leverage. Quintile 5 group is 
least likely to be financially constrained. 
 
Panel A: CAR Halts, 1999-2015 
 ProfitRatio  CashRatio  CashFlowRatio 
Financially  
Constrained Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5 
1(More) 0.75% 0.17% -0.48%  0.70% 0.28% -0.15%  0.54% 0.14% 0.03% 
2 0.55% 0.31% 0.21%  0.59% 0.46% 0.33%  0.60% 0.36% 0.04% 
3 0.36% 0.20% 0.16%  0.56% 0.38% 0.31%  0.58% 0.33% 0.18% 
4 0.55% 0.47% 0.47%  0.59% 0.39% 0.31%  0.53% 0.38% 0.19% 
5(Less) 0.72% 0.88% 0.96%   0.50% 0.49% 0.47%   0.71% 0.78% 0.80% 
            
 TotalAssets  -Leverage  -Smoothness 
Constrained Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5 
1(More) 0.94% 0.68% 0.40%  0.74% 0.34% 0.02%  0.71% 0.48% 0.19% 
2 0.52% 0.34% 0.17%  0.62% 0.46% 0.30%  0.70% 0.52% 0.32% 
3 0.56% 0.28% 0.24%  0.51% 0.33% 0.32%  0.63% 0.39% 0.24% 
4 0.44% 0.33% 0.27%  0.48% 0.43% 0.28%  0.55% 0.30% 0.27% 






Panel B: CAR Halts, 1999-2012 
 ProfitRatio  CashRatio  CashFlowRatio 
Financially  
Constrained Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5 
1(More) 0.79% 0.34% -0.59%  0.70% 0.37% -0.30%  0.58% 0.33% -0.13% 
2 0.62% 0.51% 0.06%  0.65% 0.56% 0.19%  0.66% 0.45% -0.14% 
3 0.47% 0.33% 0.05%  0.63% 0.52% 0.16%  0.59% 0.48% 0.08% 
4 0.57% 0.50% 0.27%  0.66% 0.56% 0.19%  0.61% 0.50% 0.11% 
5(Less) 0.67% 0.83% 0.76%   0.49% 0.48% 0.27%   0.70% 0.74% 0.56% 
            
 TotalAssets  -Leverage  -Smoothness 
Constrained Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5 
1(More) 0.89% 0.71% 0.14%  0.72% 0.40% -0.13%  0.63% 0.53% 0.12% 
2 0.66% 0.53% -0.01%  0.69% 0.62% 0.22%  0.70% 0.60% 0.21% 
3 0.67% 0.46% 0.14%  0.53% 0.42% 0.15%  0.63% 0.42% 0.04% 
4 0.49% 0.44% 0.14%  0.59% 0.57% 0.13%  0.64% 0.51% 0.11% 






Panel C: CAR Halts, 2013-2015 
 ProfitRatio  CashRatio  CashFlowRatio 
Financially  
Constrained Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5 
1(More) 0.52% -1.14% 0.32%  0.71% -0.45% 1.06%  0.22% -1.27% 1.24% 
2 0.01% -1.24% 1.45%  0.11% -0.33% 1.48%  0.12% -0.31% 1.49% 
3 -0.49% -0.85% 1.02%  0.07% -0.72% 1.50%  0.48% -0.80% 0.99% 
4 0.44% 0.22% 2.09%  0.14% -0.86% 1.25%  -0.04% -0.60% 0.86% 
5(Less) 1.06% 1.24% 2.59%   0.54% 0.56% 2.04%   0.76% 0.99% 2.64% 
            
 TotalAssets  -Leverage  -Smoothness 
Constrained Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5  Day -1 Day 1 Day 5 
1(More) 1.28% 0.49% 2.22%  0.87% -0.20% 1.26%  1.27% 0.06% 0.84% 
2 -0.39% -1.00% 1.44%  0.10% -0.86% 0.99%  0.64% -0.10% 1.25% 
3 -0.24% -1.10% 1.04%  0.38% -0.33% 1.54%  0.70% 0.11% 1.77% 
4 0.11% -0.61% 1.30%  -0.32% -0.66% 1.38%  -0.14% -1.29% 1.44% 
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Chapter 3  
Sensation-Seeking and Excess Volume – Cross-Country 
Evidence 
1. Introduction and Background 
This study examines whether sensation-seeking is an important determinant of trading 
volume. Trading volume deserves attention because it represents significant economic activity, 
demonstrates the impact of information on individual investors, and unveils the impact of 
information on investor disagreement (Bamber, Barron, & Stevens, 2011). Although there is a rich 
literature on trading volume, the determinants of trading volume are still considered understudied 
(De Bondt & Thaler, 1994; Shleifer, 2000). For instance, empirical research on excess volume 
generally has very low explanatory power, suggesting that current work is far from revealing the 
entire picture. 
Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Tirole (1982) argued that trading volume should not exist 
under complete markets with rational investors, which is commonly known as the “no trade 
theorems.” Tirole (1982), for instance, proposed three possibilities for the existence of nonzero 
volume: 1) risk-loving or irrational investors; 2) to increase diversification; 3) agents may have 
different prior beliefs. Black (1986) attributes the existence of trading activities to “noise.”  That 
is, investors exist who believe that noise is information. Notably, Black (1986) also proposed that 
people may trade simply because they enjoy it. 
Scholars have developed various models to derive results after relaxing the assumptions 
that will lead to a no-trade situation and explain trading activities. In Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) 
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rational expectation model, for instance, excess volume around the announcement of trading news 
occurs because people have different prior information, which triggers trading. Their hypothesis 
has been supported by numerous studies (Ali, Klasa, & Zhen Li, 2008; Atiase & Bamber, 1994; 
Bamber, Barron, & Stober, 1997; Barron, Stanford, & Yu, 2009; Kandel & Pearson, 1995; Utama 
& Cready, 1997). 
On the other hand, increasing evidence also suggests that part of the trading volume can be 
attributable to behavioral reasons. For instance, Ayers, Li, & Yeung (2011) find that different n 
groups of investors systematically responded differently to different kinds of earnings news.  
Breakthroughs from studying the behavioral factors offer new insights to the determinants of 
excess volume. For example, overconfidence has been identified as an important reason for people 
to trade (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Odean, 1998c), and this is supported by 
both archival evidence (Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001; Chuang & Lee, 2006; Glaser & Weber, 2007; 
Graham, Harvey, & Huang, 2005; Odean, 1998a, 1998b; Statman, Thorley, & Vorkink, 2006) and 
experimental evidence (Deaves, Lüders, & Luo, 2009; Gillette, Stevens, Watts, & Williams, 1999). 
However, there is no reason to believe that overconfidence is the only important personality trait 
that explains investor trading. 
The focus of this study is on sensation-seeking. Sensation-seeking is a stable personality 
trait that has been studied in psychology for more than 40 years (Zuckerman, Kolin, Price, & Zoob, 
1964). Zuckerman (1994) described it as “thrill and adventure seeking, disinhibition, experience 
seeking and boredom susceptibility.” Sensation-seeking plays a natural role in explaining trading 
activities, because trading is a novel and dynamic experience that involves decision-making and 
financial risk. A sensation-seeking individual finds stock trading entertaining and derives utility 
from it. Sensation-seeking is a fundamentally different concept from overconfidence. In Odean’s 
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(1998b) overconfidence theory of investor behavior, overconfident investors overestimate the 
precision of their private signals and thus create different prior information. In other words, 
overconfidence affects trading indirectly through the information channel. Overconfidence still 
complies with traditional asset pricing theory as overconfident investors trade to maximize their 
wealth. Sensation-seeking, on the other hand, affects trading directly as sensation-seeking 
investors simply enjoy trading and derive utility from it. 
Sensation-seeking is also distinct from risk-taking (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2009). For 
example, putting all one’s bets on one risky stock and holding it could fit a risk-taking investor’s 
appetite, but a sensation-seeking investor would find such a strategy stale and uninteresting. 
Although risk-taking and sensation-seeking can occur independently (Pizam et al., 2004), there is 
a positive correlation between sensation-seekers and risk-taking activities in daily financial matters 
(Wong & Carducci, 1991). This paper tests such a relationship in section III to assure that this 
paper’s result is not driven by a risk-taking property of sensation-seekers. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) first examine sensation-seeking as a determinant of excess 
trading volume using a unique dataset from Finland on individual behavior. They use Finnish 
traffic-ticket history as a proxy for sensation-seeking and link individuals’ traffic-ticket history to 
trading records. They find significant positive associations between whether a Finnish individual 
receives traffic tickets and her trading behavior, which is consistent with the sensation-seeking 
hypothesis. 
 My paper tests the sensation-seeking hypothesis with cross-country data. While the 
Finland data established a close link between sensation-seeking and trading volume at the 
individual level, there are two major limitations. First, traffic-ticket history is only a noisy proxy 
of sensation-seeking, as conceded by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009): “Not all sensation seekers 
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are caught speeding, nor is sensation-seeking the only motivation for a speeding ticket.”  Second, 
it is not clear whether the evidence from Finland is generalizable to other countries with different 
cultures and market settings. 
 In addition to these issues of proxies and generalizability, another motivation for a cross-
country analysis is to examine whether the individual effects of sensation-seeking play a role at 
the market level or, in other words, whether the market selection hypothesis applies here. The 
models under the market selection hypothesis suggest that in financial markets, investors may have 
different beliefs (for example, they may be overconfident or exhibit sensation-seeking), and only 
the investors with the correct belief and decision models can survive under a complete market 
(Alchian, 1950; Blume & Easley, 2006; Cootner, 1964; Fama, 1965; Friedman, 1953; Sandroni, 
2000). Therefore, if the stock market is efficient to some extent, the impact of sensation-seeking 
investors might be negligible at the market level. In a cross-country study, Chui, Titman, & Wei 
(2010)  find that overconfidence is a significant determinant of trading volume, which suggests 
that markets are not complete. It is not clear, however, how much of the effects of sensation-
seeking on volume are incremental to those due to overconfidence.  
In sum, this paper  uses a clear identification of sensation-seeking to test whether it is a 
determinant of excess volume in a cross-country setting; I also address the challenges of using an 
alternative proxy for sensation-seeking, result generalizability, and market level impacts, and I 
disentangle the effects of overconfidence. This paper predicts, and confirms, that sensation-seeking 
serves as a significant determinant of excess volume around the world. 
I test the following three hypotheses in this paper. First, I look for a positive association 
between the level of country-level sensation-seeking and total trading volume. Second, I test 
whether the market selection hypothesis applies to sensation-seeking investors. The market 
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selection hypothesis suggests that in financial markets, although investors may have different 
beliefs such as overconfidence, or have different preferences, such as sensation-seeking, only 
investors with correct beliefs and decision models can survive under a complete market (Alchian, 
1950; Blume & Easley, 2006; Cootner, 1964; Fama, 1965; Friedman, 1953; Sandroni, 2000). 
Therefore, if the stock market is complete and investors are informed, the impact of sensation-
seeking investors should become negligible at the market level. Third, I test for tail effect. Tail 
effect is directly derived from the conclusion of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009), which suggests 
that the more sensation-seeking subgroup of the population, instead of the average investors, 
contributes disproportionally to excess volume. 
2. Research Design 
There is great variation in culture and personality among different countries (Hofstede, 
2001). There is also notable variation of excess volume across different markets (Griffin, Nardari, 
& Stulz, 2007). Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) used Hofstede’s index of individualism as a measure 
of overconfidence, formed momentum strategy-based portfolios, and studied the association 
between overconfidence and momentum return. This paper follows their empirical strategy. 
 This paper relies on the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test the 
sensation-seeking hypothesis: 
𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + ∑𝛿𝐽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐽𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,                                      (3.1) 
where 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 is the natural log of excess volume of country i in month t, 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the 
measure of country i’s sensation-seeking, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐽𝑖 is a vector of J control variables. Our 
primary interest is the estimate of 𝛽. If sensation-seeking is an important determinant of trading, a 
country’s level of sensation-seeking should be positively associated with country-level excess 
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volume (i.e., 𝛽  > 0). Following Petersen (2009), I cluster standard error by both year and country, 
instead of using fixed effects. 
This paper defines volume (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡) as monthly turnover
17. Turnover is measured by dividing 
total value traded over total market capitalization of country i during time t (e.g., Griffin et al., 
2007). As Lo and Wang (2000) suggested, turnover controls for firm size and the growth of shares 
outstanding and shares traded. To be consistent with the previous literature on excess volume 
(Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001), this paper uses the natural logarithm of turnover as the dependent 
variable. The logarithm function standardizes the distribution of excess volume over different 
countries.  
Our main variable of interest, 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 , is the excitement-seeking score from the 
international survey conducted by McCrae and Terracciano (2005). Excitement-seeking is a good 
proxy because Zuckerman (1994) showed that excitement-seeking is identical to sensation-seeking, 
both theoretically and empirically. The international excitement-seeking score is constructed by 
McCrae and Terracciano (2005). I further discuss the details of their study in Section III. 
In addition, my paper intends to distinguish risk-taking and sensation-seeking by testing 
two aspects of this concern: cultural effect and market effect. That is, do citizens in countries with 
a higher sensation-seeking score appear to take more risks, and do stock markets in countries with 
a higher sensation-seeking score show lower relative risk aversion? The difference is important 
because of the market selection hypothesis. For example, Blume and Easley (2006) point out that 
in a complete market, irrational investors will be driven out of the market, while the opposite is 
                                                 
17 The excess volume has been defined either by the ratio of volume for a seven-day window near the release 
of earnings news, or by average stock turnover defined as volume over total shares outstanding. If we assume investors 
only obtain information near the release of earnings news, we can use the “earnings announcement” definition. If we 
assume that there is information flow, we can use the “average turnover” definition. 
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true in an incomplete market. Because there is international variation in market completeness, it is 
important to distinguish whether individuals are more behavior-biased or whether the markets are 
more behavior-influenced. To achieve such a goal, this paper includes two measures of risk: 
uncertainty avoidance from cultural studies by House, Javidan, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002), and 
relative risk aversion derived from consumption-based asset pricing models by Campbell (1999). 
3. Data 
3.1 Volume 
I use securities data from Thomas Financial’s Datastream International to calculate 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡; 
specifically, I use Datastream Global Equity Indices, which is a calculated index by Datastream 
that covers a minimum of 75-80% of total market capitalization. After matching Datastream 
volume data with excitement seeking scores, my sample includes 36 countries over the period from 
the base years to June 2013 (Table 3–1). Datastream uses the following equations to calculate 
market value and volume traded: 
Datastream defines market value by: 
𝑀𝑉𝑡 = ∑ (𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑡)
𝑛
1 ,                                         (3.2) 
where 𝑁𝑡  is the number of shares in issue on day t, 𝑃𝑡 is price on day t, and n is number of 
constituents in index. 
Datastream defines volume traded by: 
𝑉𝐴𝑡 = ∑ (𝑉𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑡)
𝑛
1 ,      (3.3) 




The turnover, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡, is obtained by taking the ratio of volume traded overmarket volume 
for country i in time t. 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡. 
3.2 Sensation-seeking 
One of the contributions of this paper is its use of the country-level excitement-seeking 
score from McCrae and Terracciano (2005), which identify and measures sensation-seeking 
directly. In their study, McCrae and Terracciano (2005) and their 78 collaborators from 51 cultures 
gathered observer-rating data from college students who rated college-age people or adults that 
they know. The study use a single questionnaire, the NEO-PI-R, to assess personality (NEO-PI-R 
manual, see Costa & MacCrae (1992)), and  include 12,156 individuals. 
The survey is designed based on a five-factor model, which is one of the most commonly 
used models in personality psychology (Digman, 1990). The five factors are Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience. Excitement-
seeking is one of the sub-traits, or facets, of Extraversion. McCrae and Terracciano described their 
methodology, analysis, and representativeness in two papers (McCrae & Terracciano, 2005a, 
2005b). They reported the details of their surveys, including the means and standard deviations of 
excitement-seeking scores, for each culture in Chapter 10 of Vijver (2008). 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is defined 
as the mean of excitement seeking scores of the culture in country i. 
3.3 Control Variables 
 My paper follows Chui et al.’s (2010) model to define 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐽𝑖, which includes 1) degree 
of financial market development, 𝐹𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡 , measured by the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
gross domestic products (GDP) (Stulz & Williamson, 2003); 2) level of overconfidence, 𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 , 
measured by individualism (Hofstede, 2001); and 3) GDP growth, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡. The stock market 
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capitalization comes from Datastream, and GDP data come from The World Bank (The World 
Bank, 2013). The data for GDP and GDP growth are annual data measured in 2005 US dollars.  
3.4 Measuring Risk Appetite 
The measurement of the cultural aspect of risk-taking is the Uncertainty Avoidance from 
the GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) project, denoted as 
𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑖 in this paper. The GLOBE project is also an international collaboration where scholars from 
61 countries measure nine cultural dimensions of thousands of middle managers in various 
organizations (House et al., 2002). Higher 𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑖 indicates higher uncertainty avoidance, and thus a 
higher degree of risk aversion, for an average citizen in country i. 
The measurement of the market aspect of risk-taking comes from Campbell (1999). He 
derives a consumption-based asset-pricing model and calculates “relative risk aversion” with a 
measured return and the reported interest rate. Particularly, I chose to use his RRA2 measure, which 
can be described with the following equation: 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑖 =
𝛼𝑒𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜎(𝑒𝑟𝑒)𝜎(∆𝑐)
,                                         (3.4) 
where 𝛼𝑒𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the average excess log return on stock over risk free rate, plus one half the variance 
of this excess return: 𝛼𝑒𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜎
2(𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑓)/2, 𝜎(𝑒𝑟𝑒) is the standard deviation of excess 
return. 𝜎(∆𝑐)  is the standard deviation of the log consumption growth rate18 . A higher 𝑅𝑅𝐴2𝑖 
indicates a higher risk aversion of the market in a country that I indicated by the consumption 
CAPM.  
                                                 
18 The reason I chose to report RRA2 rather than RRA1 is because as Campbell pointed out, RRA2 assumes 
a perfect correlation between excess return and consumption growth; it indicates the extent of an individual’s risk 
aversion, rather than the low correlation between consumption and stock returns. 
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Campbell (1999) calculated risk aversion for 11 developed countries. Due to the coverage 
of his data source (International Financial Statistics from International Monetary Fund and bond 
data), an exact replication of his study with the same data source cannot be applied to all countries 
in my sample. Instead, this paper obtains the MCSI return index from Datastream to calculate 𝑟𝑒, 
the real interest rate from The World Bank to calculate 𝑟𝑓  (The World Bank, 2013) and 
consumption volume from the OECD to calculate ∆𝑐 (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development). The calculated 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑖 has 25 observations. 
3.5 Summary Statistics 
For each country, Table 3–1 reports individualism scores obtained from Hofstede’s study, 
excitement-seeking scores obtained from McCrae’s study, 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 as defined above, the start 
month, and the country’s 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 in the beginning month, or when t equals zero. 
Table 3-1 
4. Result and analysis 
4.1 Sensation-seeking and risk-taking 
To confirm that 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 does not pick up the variation in investors’ different risk 
preferences, this paper measures the correlation among 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖, uncertainty avoidance from 
the GLOBE project, and two relative risk-aversion measures reported in Campbell (1999). Table 
3–2 reports the correlation matrix. If sensation-seeking investors consistently have higher risk 
tolerance, in either the cultural aspect or market aspect, one should observe a significant negative 




As shown in Table 3-2, the correlations between 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 and all three risk-aversion 
measures are not significant. Additionally, none of the three correlations exceed 0.35 in absolute 
value. Therefore, the main variable in this paper, 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 , is not driven by investors’ risk 
preference variations. 
4.2 Sensation-seeking and excess volume 
Table 3-3 reports the main result of this paper, i.e. the result of estimating equation (3.1). 
Following Chui et al. (2010),  my paper uses a two-way cluster standard error  for country and 
month. The reason for applying a two-way cluster is that we expect both a country effect and a 
time effect for excess volume. In other words, excess volume for a particular country in different 
months could be persistent; meanwhile, for a particular month, there could be events that cause 
the residuals of excess volume for a given month to be correlated across countries. Petersen (2009) 
suggests procedures to check for the existence of time or country effect by estimating the 
regression without clustering, and to cluster one-way.  This paper reports results and with 
clustering in only one dimension and without clustering. As shown in Appendix A, the result from 
clustering by country is almost identical to clustering by both country and month, while no 
clustering and clustering by month shows dramatically different results. The results suggest that 
the time effect in this scenario was negligible, and the country effect was very strong. 
As a consequence of clustering, the standard errors increase (under the full specification, 
the standard error of the coefficient of sensation-seeking increases from 0.00484 with no clustering 
to 0.0319 with two-way clustering).  Because the cross-country sample size is very limited (36 
countries with excitement-seeking score), if we estimate equation (3.1) with all control variables 
at once, the power of our test will be affected negatively. Accordingly, this paper also reports the 
results from separately estimating 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  with each control variable. Column (5) is the 
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estimation of equation (3.1) with full specification. Column (1) is the estimation of equation (3.1) 
without control variables. Column (2) to column (4) are estimations of equation (3.1) each using 
only one control variable: individualism, financial market development, and GDP growth, 
respectively. 
Table 3-3 
The sign on individualism is positive. This is consistent with Odean’s (1998c) results that 
overconfidence is a determinant of trading volume. However, Chui et al. (2010) found a significant 
coefficient of individualism on excess volume, but the coefficient of individualism in this paper 
was not significant. This paper estimated equation (3.1) using the same sample period as in Chui 
et al. (2010), but I still did not get a significant coefficient. I requested sample data from Professor 
Chui. Comparing the sample data he provided, I obtained the key variables as he did for Hong 
Kong and Japan for the monthly turnover from the base years to June 2003. Therefore, I suspect 
this lack of significance is due to different control variables, because the correct control variable 
can reduce the noise reflected in the individualism index. Also, in Table 3-3, the t-statistic varies 
substantially under different specifications, which suggests that the result is very sensitive to 
different control variables. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this paper, data required to 
calculate some control variables, such as the Political Risk Index, were not available at Cornell 
University. I will include control variables used in Chui et al. (2010) in subsequent versions once 
the data become available. 
The sign on financial market development was positive. This is consistent with the idea 
that a country with a better developed financial market should have more people involved in 
trading and, on average, should have a lower cost of capital that encourages trading activity. The 
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sign on GDP growth is negative, which suggests that developing countries have higher excess 
volume than developed countries. 
This paper finds a positive coefficient of sensation-seeking on excess volume, but the 
coefficient is not significant. This contradicts the hypothesis that sensation-seeking is a 
determinant of trading volume. The result seems particularly surprising given the robust findings 
of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009). This paper proposes three explanations for this lack of 
significance. 
The first explanation is the market selection hypothesis. One of the objectives of this paper 
is to test whether the market selection hypothesis applies to sensation-seeking investors. Although 
the impact of sensation-seeking investors at the market level is small in Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2009),  this cannot be  attributed to the market selection hypothesis because speeding-ticket 
history only captures a subset of sensation-seeking investors. The cross-country setting in this 
paper is a more direct test of the market selection hypothesis. The robust findings of Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2009) supports the existence of a sensation-seeking effect on excess volume at the 
individual level. The non-significant result in this paper fails to reject the null hypothesis that 
sensation-seeking is not an important determinant of excess volume at the market level. The 
combination of these two findings supports the market selection hypothesis: sensation-seeking 
investors trade more than average at the individual level, but the share of wealth in the market by 
sensation-seeking investors is not enough to produce excess volume at the market level.  
Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2010) suggested that there exists cross-country variation in 
market efficiency. They further argue that the level of market efficiency within a country can be 
quantified by the returns to trading strategies based on past returns and earnings announcements. 
The momentum strategy return in Chui et al. (2010) is one of the returns to trading strategies and 
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thus serves as a proxy for measuring the degree of market efficiency. Table 3-4 tests the prediction 
of a greater sensation-seeking effect in countries with a lower degree of market efficiency. My 
paper first ranked countries based on momentum strategy return calculated in Chui et al. (2010), 
then assigned a dummy variable Low.  The dummy variable equals zero for the 19 countries with 
a higher momentum return and equals one for the 18 countries with a lower momentum return19 to 
indicate a lower momentum return, and, thus, higher market efficiency.  The prediction is that 
sensation-seeking investors have a greater impact on trading volume in less efficient markets, so 
we should expect sensation-seeking in a country with a lower momentum return (higher market 
efficiency) to have a lower effect on excess volume. In other words, the interaction of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 
and Low should have a significantly negative coefficient.  
Table 3-4 
The result in Table 3-4 is insignificantly negative. There are two features in the results that 
deserve our attention. First, the t-statistic for the coefficient of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖*Low is significantly 
greater than that of the coefficient for 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 in Table 3-3. This increase suggests that the 
degree of market efficiency indeed affects the sensation-seeking effect on excess volume. Second, 
the t-statistic for the individualism index dramatically increases and the coefficient is significant 
at 1% level under the new specification. This change of significance provides more evidence that 
results are sensitive to different control variables. 
One should be careful about crediting this result to a correct prediction of the market 
selection hypothesis. The market selection hypothesis makes strong assumptions that investors are 
                                                 
19 This paper also tested the estimation by assigning zero to low for the 18 higher momentum return countries 
and 1 for the 19 lower return countries, as well as dropping the three negative momentum return countries. The results 
do not change. 
 110 
 
smart and rational—they utilize all information, use Bayesian logic to update their beliefs, 
maximize utility with rational expectations, and know the true value of parameters such as discount 
factors. Such investors may not exist. Meanwhile, the definition of market “completeness” in these 
models is different than the definition of market “efficiency” that Griffin et al. (2010) used.  The 
difference between a complete market and an incomplete market is that in complete markets there 
are enough assets to span the states space, while in an incomplete market an investor cannot insure 
against all odds. The difference between an efficient market and an inefficient market in Griffin et 
al. (2010) depends on whether investors can gain extraordinary risk-adjusted returns from past 
public information, which is commonly known as “semi-strong form efficiency.” The market 
selection hypothesis suggests that investors who are not smart or rational will vanish in complete 
markets, yet might survive or even dominate in incomplete markets. For example, in Blume and 
Easley (2006), an overconfident investor in an incomplete market could dominate the market 
eventually because she saves too much. These results, however, cannot be directly interpreted 
using a market efficiency idea. For instance, if a behavior-biased investor loses less in a less 
efficient market and loses more in a more efficient market, then, by the intuition of the market 
selection hypothesis, such an investor should make a larger impact in a more efficient market than 
in a less efficient market. 
Without theoretical models, the estimation in Table 3-4 alone cannot establish a direct 
relationship between the market selection hypothesis and the non-significant coefficient on 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 in Table 3-3. Table 3-4 does tell us, however, that the sensation-seeking effect is 
greater in less efficient markets. 
The second explanation is tail effects. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) showed that Finnish 
investors with speeding-ticket histories are more likely to trade. In my paper, one hypothesis that 
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predicts a significant coefficient of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the following: countries where people have 
higher sensation-seeking scores on average are more likely to have higher excess volume. Grinblatt 
and Keloharju’s (2009) conclusion is not equivalent to this assumption: people with a history of 
speeding tickets are not average people:they are the more sensation-seeking group of the 
population or, in other words, the tail. It is possible that trading volume is generated by this 
subgroup of people who are more sensation-seeking than average individuals. 
To test this possibility, I construct 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 , which equals the mean of the 
excitement-seeking score of country i plus two times the standard deviation of the excitement-
seeking score of country i. I then re-estimate equation (3.1) but substitute 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 for 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖. 
Table 3-5 
In the full specification in column (5), the coefficient of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 is not significant; 
t-statistics of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖  as well as the adjusted R
2 increased under all specifications. 
Particularly, the coefficient of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 in specification (1) is significantly positive at the 
5% level. This paper also reports the estimation result by defining 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 as the mean of 
the excitement-seeking score of country i plus the standard deviation of the excitement-seeking 
score of country i, and mean of excitement-seeking score of country i plus three times the standard 
deviation of excitement-seeking score of country i in Appendix B. The t-statistics of the coefficient 
of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 monotonically increases when adding more multiples of standard deviation of 
the excitement-seeking scores. For example, if we defined 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 as the mean of the 
excitement-seeking score of country i plus seven times the standard deviation of the excitement-
seeking score of country i, the coefficient of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 under specification (1) will be 
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significant at 1%, and the coefficients of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 under specification (3) and (4) will be 
significant at 5%. The results suggest that the tail effect might explain part of the story here, as 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 proxies for scores of the more sensation-seeking subgroup of the population. 
However, because the constructed variable 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 may not be a proxy for the more 
sensation-seeking subgroup of the population, it is premature to claim that the sensation-seeking 
group of investors generates excess volume. To confidently identify that the “tail effect” is the key 
to understanding sensation-seeking and excess volume, we need more detailed data that classify 
the population into finer subgroups in terms of level of sensation-seeking, and then to study the 
sensation-seeking subgroups separately. 
The third possible explanation is that sensation-seeking is simply a behavior attribute and 
cannot directly affect trading volume. Without a larger sample size, the non-significant result in 
this paper only suggests that we failed to reject the null hypothesis, but the power of our test is not 
strong enough to disqualify sensation-seeking as an important determinant of trading volume. If 
we are able to find a time-varying measure that can correctly represent the sensation-seeking 
difference in each country at different time periods, the test will be substantially more powerful.  
Alternatively, if scholars conduct cross-cultural studies similar to those of McCrae and Terracciano 
(2005a) that measures finer subgroups in each culture, we can also increase the power of our test. 
Meanwhile, better control variables can also increase the accuracy of the estimation of 
sensation-seeking. As indicated in the analysis of Table 3-3 and Table 3-4, the most probable reason 
for the different level of significance in the individualism index in this paper compared to Chui et 
al. (2010) is the difference in control variables. Therefore, if the data required to replicate the 
control variables in Chui et al. (2010) become available, this paper can estimate the effect of 
sensation-seeking on excess volume more accurately. 
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5. Conclusion and directions for future research 
This paper tests the hypothesis that sensation-seeking is a determinant of excess volume in 
a cross-country setting. After running an ordinary least squares regression of turnover on the 
excitement-seeking score and several control variables, this paper does not find a significant 
coefficient for sensation-seeking, suggesting that excess volume is significantly related to 
sensation-seeking in a cross-country setting. Subsample analysis further indicates that this lack of 
significance might be explained by different degrees of market efficiency, and might be explained 
by the tail effect. Although this paper is not able to validate the market selection hypothesis and 
the tail effect hypothesis, it provides tests that support the predictions of these hypotheses. 
Besides the main result, this paper has three implications. First, sensation-seeking is not 
the same as risk-taking. Second, the cross-country results are sensitive to control variables. Third, 
the country effect predominates over turnover data. 
Future research can focus on investigating different subsamples to identify where 
sensation-seeking affects trading activities and which subgroups of investors generate the results. 
For instance, recent work suggested that institutional investors generate a majority of trading 
volume in the United States. Jones and Lipson (2004) found that in 2002 non-retail trading was 
responsible for 94% of NYSE trading volume.  However, the size of the holdings of cross-country 
institutional investors vary. Griffin et al. (2007) found institutional investors in Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea, and Thailand were responsible for 50, 18, 8, and 7% of all trading volumes, respectively. 
In addition, institutional investors held 44% of market capitalization of China A Share, which is 
the primary exchange in the country (Lu, 2007). The common perception is that institutional 
investors are sophisticated and thus less subject to behavior biases, such as sensation-seeking. If 
such an assumption is true, there might be a more significant effect of sensation-seeking on trading 
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volumes in countries where there is a low percentage of holdings by institutional investors. This 
paper was not able to find a sample with enough cross-country variation in institutional holdings. 
Nevertheless, the measurement of institutional ownership by large firms documented by Porta, 
Lopez‐ De‐ Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) also has the potential to serve as a proxy  for institutional 
holdings and can be utilized to explain sensation-seeking effect.  
Research can test the relationship between the market selection hypothesis and sensation-
seeking effect on excess volume by comparing the performance of sensation-seeking investors 
across different countries. If it is indeed the case that sensation-seekers perform worse relative to 
the market in more efficient markets than in less efficient markets, we will be able to more 
confidently credit the lack of significance of the sensation-seeking effect on excess volume to the 
market selection hypothesis. Meanwhile, more data on sensation-seeking or on trading behavior 
are always valuable. 
Last but not least, almost all theoretical financial models are based on the assumption that 
investors trade to maximize consumption and minimize risk. The possibility of other payoff 
functions, such as trading for sensation-seeking, deserves more consideration. Also, most finance 
models study complete markets versus incomplete markets, while not enough attention is paid to 
efficient markets versus inefficient markets.  Researchers will truly understand the implications 






Table 3-1: Summary Statistics 
Our sample consists of data on stock turnover from 36 markets around the world. We 
require each country in our sample to have a score on McCrae and Terracciano’s cross-country 
survey. The turnover data are from Datastream. This table reports the name of the country/area. 
For each country/area, this table also reports its beginning month where data are available; its 
individualism index from Hofstede’s study, IDVi;  the excitement seeking score from McCrae and 
Terracciano’s study, Sⅇnsationi ;  the average turnover across sample period, LnVolt̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ; and the 





LnVolt̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Beginning Month LnVolit 
at Beginning Month 
Argentina 46 49.5 2.1 1993m7 1.5 
Australia 90 54.9 3.8 1984m1 2.7 
Austria 55 47.1 3.5 1986m8 2.1 
Belgium 75 50.6 2.9 1986m1 1.6 
Brazil 38 52.9 3.6 1999m1 3.7 
Canada 80 52.7 3.2 1973m6 0.8 
Chile 23 49.1 2.2 1989m7 2.9 
China 20 47.9 4.2 1991m8 2.4 
Czech Republic 57 42.9 3 1993m11 -6.3 
Denmark 74 47.2 3 1988m4 -1.2 
Finland 63 50.5 3.3 1988m3 -0.6 
France 71 47.5 3.6 1988m6 -1.1 
Germany 67 46.1 2.7 1988m6 4 
Hong Kong 25 47.5 3.6 1988m6 3.6 
India 48 50.4 3.3 1995m1 1 
Indonesia 14 49.7 2.9 1990m4 3.3 
Ireland 70 52.9 3.8 2001m1 1.8 
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Italy 76 46.5 3.7 1986m7 1.6 
Japan 46 50 3.9 1990m12 3.1 
Korea 18 49.4 4.4 1987m9 3.9 
Malaysia 26 49.1 2.8 1986m1 1.4 
New Zealand 79 54.9 3.3 1990m1 2.4 
Peru 16 51 2 1994m1 3.4 
Philippines 32 51.2 2.5 1990m1 0.8 
Poland 60 47.8 3.4 1994m3 4.8 
Portugal 27 52.6 3.1 1990m1 -1.2 
Russia 39 49 2.9 1998m1 0.8 
Slovenia 19 46.3 2.5 1999m1 3.6 
Spain 51 46.3 4.2 1990m2 2.2 
Switzerland 68 45.2 3.9 1989m1 0.2 
Thailand 20 49.8 3.7 1987m1 3.9 
Turkey 37 51.1 4.1 1988m1 1.3 
UK 89 53.2 4.1 1986m10 2.1 






Table 3-2: Correlations Between Sensation-seeking and Different Risk-taking Measures 
The pairwise correlation matrix between three risk aversion measures and Sⅇnsationi . 
RRA1i and RRA2i  were obtained from Campbell (1999). UAIi is the uncertainty avoidance index 
reported in the GLOBE project. For each correlation, p-value is reported in parentheses and 
number of observations is reported in the third row. 



















































Table 3-3: Sensation-seeking and Excess Volume  
OLS estimates the coefficients related to trading volume under different specifications. The 
market trading volume of country i in month t (Volit) is measured as the market’s value traded in 
month t, aggregated by daily value traded, divided by the market’s capitalization in month t, both 
in local currency. The natural logarithm of monthly market trading volume of country i in month t 
(LnVolit ) is regressed on McCrae and Terracciano’s excitement seeking score (Sⅇnsationi ), 
Hofstede’s individualism index (IDVi ), financial market development measured by market i’s 
market capitalization divided by its GDP (FMDit), and GDP growth (Growthit). Column (5) is the 
estimation of LnVolit   for all four variables. Column (1) is the estimation of LnVolit   for 
Sⅇnsationi. Column (2) to column (4) are estimations of LnVolit  for Sⅇnsationi and one control 
variable: individualism, financial market development and GDP growth, respectively. The sample 
period is from base year for each market reported in Table 3-1 to January 2013. This paper follows 
Petersen (2009) and Chui et al. (2010) and clusters standard error by both country and month. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 











IDVi  0.00673 
(1.45) 
  0.00644 
(1.40) 


















Observations 10064 10064 9193 9189 9189 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.025 0.006 0.024 0.041 
t statistics in parentheses 




Table 3-4: Market Selection Hypothesis 
OLS estimates the coefficients related to trading volume under different specifications as 
in Table 3-3, with the addition of a dummy variable, Low, and thⅇ product of Sⅇnsationi and Low, 
Sⅇnsationi*Low. Low takes a value of one for the 18 markets with lower momentum returns in 
Chui et al. (2010) and Low takes  a value of zero for the 19 markets with higher momentum returns. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


































  0.0172*** 
(5.49) 





















Observations 10064 10064 9193 9189 9189 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.096 0.037 0.075 0.144 
t statistics in parentheses 




Table 3-5: Tail Effect 
This table reports the OLS estimates the coefficients related to trading volume under 
different specifications as in Table 3-3, but substitute Sⅇnsationi  with Sⅇnsation_taili . 
Sⅇnsation_taili  is constructed by summing Sⅇnsationi  and two times standard deviations of 
excitement seeking scores reported in Vijver (2008). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












IDVi  0.00497 
(1.03) 
  0.00475 
(0.93) 


















Observations 10064 10064 9193 9189 9189 
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.033 0.023 0.036 0.047 
t statistics in parentheses 






Relationship Between Calculated 𝐑𝐑𝐀𝟐𝐢 and 𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐢 
The relationship between calculated 𝑅𝑅𝐴2𝑖 and 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖. 𝑅𝑅𝐴2𝑖 =
𝛼𝑒𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜎(𝑒𝑟𝑒)𝜎(∆𝑐)
, where 
𝛼𝑒𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the average excess log return on stock over risk free rate, plus one half the variance of this 
excess return: 𝛼𝑒𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜎
2(𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑓)/2. 𝜎(𝑒𝑟𝑒) is the standard deviation of excess return. 
𝜎(∆𝑐) is the standard deviation of the log consumption growth rate. Higher 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑖 indicates higher 
risk aversion .This paper obtains MCSI return index from Datastream to calculate 𝑟𝑒, real interest 
rate from World Bank to calculate 𝑟𝑓, and consumption volume from OECD to calculate ∆𝑐 . Panel 
A reports the summary statistics, and Panel B reports the OLS estimation of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 on 𝑅𝑅𝐴2𝑖. 
Robust t-statistics is in the parentheses. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Countries 𝑅𝑅𝐴2𝑖   𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  
Australia -12.1 54.9 
Austria -5.6 47.1 
Brazil -2.8 52.9 
Canada -6.3 52.7 
Chile -2.4 49.1 
Czech Republic -1.5 42.9 
Denmark -1.4 47.2 
Finland -3.3 50.5 
France -9 47.5 
Germany -1.4 46.1 
Indonesia -4 49.7 
Ireland -11.1 52.9 
Italy -2 46.5 
Japan -2.5 50 
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Korea -4.3 49.4 
Mexico -5.8 49.3 
New Zealand 4.6 54.9 
Poland -4 47.8 
Portugal -2.2 52.6 
Slovenia -2.7 46.3 
Spain -11.7 46.3 
Switzerland -0.2 45.2 
Turkey -4.2 51.1 
United Kingdom -3.4 53.2 
United States -13.2 54.2 
Panel B: Regression 
























Different Clustering Treatments 
OLS estimates the coefficients related to trading volume under different specifications as 
in Table 3-3, with different clustering treatments. Panel A reports the estimation results without 
clustering. Panel B reports the estimation results clustered by month. Panel C reports the estimation 
results clustered by country. 
Panel A: No Cluster 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖   0.00673
*** 
(13.66) 
  0.00644*** 
(9.97) 




















Observations 10064 10064 9193 9189 9189 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.025 0.006 0.024 0.041 
Panel B: Cluster by Month 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖   0.00673
*** 
(13.66) 
  0.00644*** 
(9.97) 






















Observations 10064 10064 9193 9189 9189 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.025 0.006 0.024 0.041 
Panel C: Cluster by Country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  










𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖   0.00673 
(1.45) 
  0.00644 
(1.39) 


















Observations 10064 10064 9193 9189 9189 






Alternative Definitions of 𝑺𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒊 
OLS estimates the coefficients related to trading volume under different specifications as 
in Table V, with different definitions of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖.  
Panel A: 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖=𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝐷𝑖  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  










𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖   0.00584 
(1.22) 
  0.00549 
(1.11) 


















Observations 10064 10064 9193 9189 9189 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.028 0.014 0.031 0.044 
Panel B: 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖=𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 3 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑆𝐷𝑖 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖   0.00433 
(0.90) 
  0.00428 
(0.83) 


















Observations 10064 10064 9193 9189 9189 
 126 
 





Alchian, A. A. (1950). Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 58(3), 211-221.  
Ali, A., Klasa, S., & Zhen Li, O. (2008). Institutional stakeholdings and better-informed traders at 
earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46(1), 47-61.  
Atiase, R. K., & Bamber, L. S. (1994). Trading volume reactions to annual accounting earnings 
announcements: The incremental role of predisclosure information asymmetry. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 17(3), 309-329.  
Ayers, B. C., Li, O. Z., & Yeung, P. E. (2011). Investor trading and the post-earnings-announcement 
drift. The Accounting Review, 86(2), 385-416.  
Bamber, L. S., Barron, O. E., & Stevens, D. E. (2011). Trading volume around earnings 
announcements and other financial reports: Theory, research design, empirical evidence, 
and directions for future research*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(2), 431-471.  
Bamber, L. S., Barron, O. E., & Stober, T. L. (1997). Trading volume and different aspects of 
disagreement coincident with earnings announcements. Accounting Review, 575-597.  
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2000). Trading is hazardous to your wealth: The common stock 
investment performance of individual investors. The Journal of finance, 55(2), 773-806.  
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2001). Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common stock 
investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 261-292.  
Barron, O. E., Stanford, M. H., & Yu, Y. (2009). Further Evidence on the Relation between 
Analysts' Forecast Dispersion and Stock Returns*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
26(2), 329-357.  
Black, F. (1986). Noise. The Journal of finance, 41(3), 529-543. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-
6261.1986.tb04513.x 
Blume, L., & Easley, D. (2006). If you're so smart, why aren't you rich? Belief selection in 
complete and incomplete markets. Econometrica, 74(4), 929-966.  
Campbell, J. Y. (1999). Asset prices, consumption, and the business cycle. Handbook of 
macroeconomics, 1, 1231-1303.  
Chuang, W.-I., & Lee, B.-S. (2006). An empirical evaluation of the overconfidence hypothesis. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(9), 2489-2515. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.08.007 
Chui, A. C., Titman, S., & Wei, K. J. (2010). Individualism and momentum around the world. The 
Journal of finance, 65(1), 361-392.  
Cootner, P. H. (1964). The random character of stock market prices.  
Costa, P. T., & MacCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) and NEO 




Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., & Subrahmanyam, A. (1998). Investor psychology and security market 
under‐and overreactions. The Journal of finance, 53(6), 1839-1885.  
De Bondt, W. F., & Thaler, R. H. (1994). Financial decision-making in markets and firms: A 
behavioral perspective: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Deaves, R., Lüders, E., & Luo, G. Y. (2009). An experimental test of the impact of overconfidence 
and gender on trading activity. Review of finance, 13(3), 555-575.  
Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality structure: Emergence of the five-factor model. Annual review 
of psychology, 41(1), 417-440.  
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. The journal of Business, 38(1), 34-105.  
Friedman, M. (1953). Essays in positive economics (Vol. 231): University of Chicago Press. 
Gillette, A. B., Stevens, D. E., Watts, S. G., & Williams, A. W. (1999). Price and Volume Reactions 
to Public Information Releases: An Experimental Approach Incorporating Traders' 
Subjective Beliefs*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(3), 437-479.  
Glaser, M., & Weber, M. (2007). Overconfidence and trading volume. The Geneva Risk and 
Insurance Review, 32(1), 1-36.  
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Huang, H. (2005). Investor competence, trading frequency, and 
home bias: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Griffin, J. M., Kelly, P. J., & Nardari, F. (2010). Do market efficiency measures yield correct 
inferences? A comparison of developed and emerging markets. Review of Financial Studies, 
23(8), 3225-3277.  
Griffin, J. M., Nardari, F., & Stulz, R. M. (2007). Do investors trade more when stocks have 
performed well? Evidence from 46 countries. Review of Financial Studies, 20(3), 905-951.  
Grinblatt, M., & Keloharju, M. (2009). Sensation seeking, overconfidence, and trading activity. 
The Journal of finance, 64(2), 549-578.  
Hofstede, G. H. (2001). Culture's consequences: SAGE Publications, Incorporated. 
House, R., Javidan, M., Hanges, P., & Dorfman, P. (2002). Understanding cultures and implicit 
leadership theories across the globe: an introduction to project GLOBE. Journal of world 
business, 37(1), 3-10.  
Jones, C. M., & Lipson, M. L. (2004). Are retail orders different. unpublished paper, Columbia 
University and University of Georgia.  
Kandel, E., & Pearson, N. D. (1995). Differential interpretation of public signals and trade in 
speculative markets. Journal of Political Economy, 831-872.  
Kim, O., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Trading Volume and Price Reactions to Public 
Announcements. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 302-321. doi: 10.2307/2491051 
Lu, A. (2007, 2007-08-27). Institutional investors hold 44% of China's A-share market cap.   




McCrae, R. R., & Terracciano, A. (2005a). Personality profiles of cultures: Aggregate personality 
traits. Journal of personality and social psychology, 89(3), 407-425.  
McCrae, R. R., & Terracciano, A. (2005b). Universal features of personality traits from the 
observer’s perspective: Data from 50 cultures. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 88(3), 547-561.  
Milgrom, P., & Stokey, N. (1982). Information, trade and common knowledge. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 26(1), 17-27.  
Odean, T. (1998a). Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? The Journal of finance, 53(5), 
1775-1798.  
Odean, T. (1998b). Do investors trade too much? Available at SSRN 94143.  
Odean, T. (1998c). Volume, volatility, price, and profit when all traders are above average. The 
Journal of finance, 53(6), 1887-1934.  
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. 2013.   Retrieved 7.21, 2013, from 
http://www.oecd.org/statistics/ 
Petersen, M. A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480.  
Pizam, A., Jeong, G.-H., Reichel, A., van Boemmel, H., Lusson, J. M., Steynberg, L., . . . 
Montmany, N. (2004). The relationship between risk-taking, sensation-seeking, and the 
tourist behavior of young adults: A cross-cultural study. Journal of Travel Research, 42(3), 
251-260.  
Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. 
The Journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517.  
Sandroni, A. (2000). Do markets favor agents able to make accurate predictions? Econometrica, 
68(6), 1303-1341.  
Shleifer, A. (2000). Inefficient Markets: An introduction to behavioural finance: New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
Statman, M., Thorley, S., & Vorkink, K. (2006). Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume. 
Review of Financial Studies, 19(4), 1531-1565. doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhj032 
Stulz, R. M., & Williamson, R. (2003). Culture, openness, and finance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 70(3), 313-349.  
The World Bank. (2013). Real Interest Rate.   Retrieved 7.21, 2013, from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR 
Tirole, J. (1982). On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations. Econometrica, 
50(5), 1163-1181. doi: 10.2307/1911868 
Utama, S., & Cready, W. M. (1997). Institutional ownership, differential predisclosure precision 
and trading volume at announcement dates. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(2), 
129-150.  
Vijver, F. J. R. v. d. H. D. A. v. P. Y. H. (2008). Multilevel analysis of individuals and cultures. New 
York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 130 
 
Wong, A., & Carducci, B. J. (1991). Sensation seeking and financial risk taking in everyday money 
matters. Journal of Business and Psychology, 5(4), 525-530.  
Zuckerman, M., Kolin, E. A., Price, L., & Zoob, I. (1964). Development of a sensation-seeking 
scale. Journal of consulting psychology, 28(6), 477.  
 
 
